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probability of failure is as low as possible. The degree of 
reliability required of the system is determined by its applica­
tion. High reliability is particularly, important in systems where 
computer failure could lead to loss of life.., or to injury, or to 
financial loss.
Much research has endeavoured to develop techniques fo r  reducing 
the probability of computer failure. In this dissertation, such 
techniques are described and discussed.
The dissertation proceeds to describe the development of an ex­
perimental fault-tolerant computer system which is sufficiently 
flexible to allow the examination of ‘ several techniques for 
achieving high reliability. Particular issues arising from the 
application of the techniques of triple-modular redundancy and 
software— implemented fault-tolerance to the system are discussed.
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1.1 Introduction
Since the early use o,' computers in which they were installed 
primarily to produce answers to numerical p r o blems, they have b e ­
come integrated more and more into our everyday environment. We 
can now find them in a variety of f o rms, strapped to our wrists, 
installed in our car s , and suspended hundreds of kilometers above
With computers taking such an active part in our l i v e s , their 
failure can often cause dangerous situations, where death, injury 
or financial loss can result. Consider, for ex'fjple, a nuclear 
power plant, controlled by a process system usitig a  series of 
digital computers. The failure of a computer can clearly be very 
se r ious, and it is naturally desirable to prevent such situations 
from arising. This has led to much work in designing computer 
systems which are as reliable as possible.
1.2 Minimization of Computer-related Dangerous Situations
Three main philosophies have emerged for the minimization of 
computer-related danger. These may be summarized as;
- Fault avoidance
- Fail-safety
- Fault tolerance
1.2.1 Fault Avoidance
An obvious way of preventing computers from causing harm to the 
plant, oc to the environment which they control, is to make sure 
that they never fail! The philosophy which attempts to accomplish 
this goal is known as "fault avoidance".
Fault avoidance requires that the physical components of a c om­
puter system, and their assembly m e t h o d s , are as perfect as p os­
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sible. The cost of obtaining near-perfect components is often ex­
cessive, and maintenance staff must be continuously available 
because the system ceases to operate upon first failure. So, 
feult-avoidance techniques are clearly expensive and imperfect 
[ H i  and may consequently not result in adequate reliability.
1.2.2 Fail-SafetV1-'
In view of the problems relating t u t h e  design of perfect sys­
tems, the emphasis in research has focused on ensuring that com­
puter failures do not lead to harm if and when they occur. This 
leads to another philosophy, namely that of “fail-safety".
i
To achieve fail-safety, it is necessary that when a computer sys­
tem ceases to operate, it does so in such a manner that it can 
have no harmful effect on the environment over which it has in­
fluence. A particularly gtiod example: of the application of fail- 
safety techniques can be found in the area of railway signalling. 
If the system which manipulates the signals of a railway 
system fails, then all affected signals are set to STOP, so that 
trains in the area come to a halt, and hence avoid collision or 
derailment.
1.2.3 Fault Tolerance I
There are situationo, however, 
computer from a system cannot be 
undesirable side-e?fects.
where the removal of the 
accomplished without
In many industrial processes, loss of control spells ruiti of 
the product, with the additional possibility of permanent damage 
to equipment. In such a circumstance, a fail-safe end to 
control does little to prevent considerable financial loss.
An even worse case may be considered: the failure of a fly-by- 
wire aircraft r.vntrol system (one in which contro) signals to the 
aircraft take the form of electrical signals rather than 
mechanical links) could lead to the loss of the aircraft and
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crew. Mechanical back-up systems may be used in certain 
cases, but experimental aircraft are being developed which
depend entirely upon the fast and accurate capabilities of a
computer to maintain controllability [2].
In the case of remote equipment, . such as weather monitoring 
stations and satellites, it is not possible to effect early 
repair should the computer system fail. Unless self-repair 
and/or graceful degradation facilities are built into the 
system, use of the system is totally lost when a fault occurs. 
Once again, therefore, fail-safety is inadequate.
There is consequently a need for computer systems which
operate even when there are faults in the system. This leads 
to the concept of "fault-tolerance", which has been defined 
as "the ability of a system to operate correctly in the
presence of faults" [3], and is the central topic of this 
dissertation.
1.3 Investigations into Fault-Tolerance
Over the past decade, much research effort has been dedicated to 
the development of fault— tolerant computer systems, and this 
has resulted in a large number of techniques being proposed as 
suitable for particular applications.
By definition, a fault-tolerant system must be designed assuming 
that some components will fail. The key ingredient in all fault- 
tolerance techniques is therefore redundancy - of information, 
resources and/or time. The type and extent of the redundancy 
employed in the system depends on the technique used, as well, as 
on the intended application. The techniques of fault-tolerance 
fall into two loosely defined categories:
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1.3.1 Replication
Prom the literature, "replication" is evidently the most popular 
technique being used today. Many identical or, similar units are 
u s e d , and all fault-free units arn active, that is to say, they 
contribute to the operation of the system as a whole. When a 
unit's failure is detected, the system attempts to reconfigure 
with one unit les s . Hence, execution time might lengthen, but all 
essential services are maintained.
1.3.2 Back-up \
"Back-up11 is the second widely used technique (See fig. 1). In 
this approach, only is operational, while one or more
units are available e .,m » • If the spare units are powered in 
the idle state, tht ! /ysfcem is referred to as "hot" back­
up. Sometimes, unpowereti. Vp'ares are used, in an attempt to lower 
the spare failure rate. - ‘S-tie units are connected to the process 
through a switching mechanism that keeps only one active at a 
time. The active processor performs comprehensive self-checking, 
and is switched out when faulty.
INTRODUCTION
PROCESSOR PROCESSOR
SWITCH
PROCESS
1 - The Hot Back-Up Configuration [4]
i of hot back-up, known as "pair-and-a-spare" 
ited (See fig. 2). In this* the active and 
each consist of two m o d ules, thus forming a 
capable of reliable aelf-checking.
V / ' - '
1,
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FIGURE 2 - The Pair-and-o-Spare Configuration [5] 
1.4 Research Project Objectives
This project had two major objectives. Firstly, it aimed to g en­
erate insight into the field of fault*'tolerance, and 
ly to produce a flexible experimental system which could 
for studying various fault-tolerance techniques.
It was felt that at this stage in the development of fnult- 
tolerant systems, little practical experience exists, creating a 
need for the project. H o w ever, the effort investigating foult-
was not a imply „o facilitate the production of
system; it was also desirable to gain expertise 
in the field of fault-tolerance, with a view to applying
the knowledge in future projects.
■ U ’".
It was therefore necessary to b 
the project beyond that
le theoretical side of 
for the production of the
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experimental system. To this end, various aspects of the topic 
required further attention, such as;
- investigations into the theory of fault-tolerance
- atudy of important current systems, both commercially avail­
able, and undergoing development
It should be pointed out that the composition of much of the ex­
perimental system developed was defined by available equipment 
and tools. These constraints are discussed in the appropriate 
place in the dissertation.
Development of the experimental system consisted of:
- selection of a representative fault-tolerance technique 
for demonsteation of the system
-  investigations into software engineering techniques
- production of a suite of software modules for use in the 
various system configurations
-  integration of the software and hardware components of the 
system
- application to a real-time, but simple sorvo-control system 
so as to provide a live demonstration
1.5 Overview of the Diaaertation
The remainder of this dissertation covers the following a r eas:
Chapter 2 - Paul I;-Tolerance - a discussion of techniques for
achieving fault-tolerance and for evaluating fault-tolerant
Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION
Chapter 3 - Software Development Techniques - Structured
design, structured programming, data flow techniques, top-down 
design, verification, validation, and debugging
Chapter 4 - System Description - System requirements,
functional specification of the system
Chapter 5 - System Design ■* Hardware characteristics, software
requirements, functional specification of the software, and 
software characteris tics
Chapter 6 - System Integration - Development of the software
required for system control and testing, and implementation of 
the system
Chapter 7 - Conclusion - A brief summary of the results of the
research followed by  a discussion of  the more important 
findings and conclusions as well as unsolved issues
1,6 Summary
Because of the wide use of computers in critical applications, 
it has become necessary for attention to be given to the 
problem of computer faults. The main computer-fault handling 
techniques are
- Fault ovoidanco,
- Fail-safety, and
- Fault tolerance.
Research effort into tho technique of fault tolerance has led 
to many fault tolerance methods, which can be loosely divided 
into the categories of
- Replication, and
- Back-up.
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'■Tfc* goals of the current project were to gain insight into 
the field of foult-tolerance, and to produce a flexible
experimental system for use in the study of fault-tolerance 
techniques<
To provide a sound basis for the development of an experimental 
system, an extensive study into fault tolerance was undertaken, 
and this is covered in the next few chapters.
The benefits of employing fault-tolerance to computer system 
design are m a n y , but in essence, lead to reduced system lifetime 
costs. In this chapter, various aspects of fault-tolerance are 
explored, and L  t most critical areas are highlighted. Many cur­
rent fault-toleraht systems are referred to, and are described in 
detail in appendix 1..
2.1.1 Motivation for the use of Fault-tolerance Techniques
A number of factors have led to the development of fault- 
tolerance techniques, the moat important being;
Reliability. Since maintenance and general downtime costs have 
risen to become a large proportion of total system lifetime cost, 
it is obviously desirable that systems should be designed to fail 
as seldom as possible.
Data integrity. Because computers are used in highly critical 
areas, it is essential that data corruption is higlly improbable.
Availability. From a users point of view, it is necessary that 
computer down-time is minimized, especially when the service 
provided by the system involves human interaction.
Graceful Degradation. Remote computer equipment must function far 
as long os possible without repair. In the '‘ttreme situation 
of, say, an unmanned spacecraft, no repairs at all ore possible; 
any failure should not lead to a total system failure, but merely 
a drop in performance.
It should be no ed that these are the most obvious points of 
improvement brought about through the use of fault-tolerance 
techniques; other facilities which may be provided by the ap­
plication of the philosophy include:
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On-line maintenance (the ability to perform repairs without 
switching the system o f f ) , A fault-tolerant system would regard 
the removal of a single unit as a unit failure, and continue in 
its normal fault-handling manner.
Fail-safe operation (the prevention of dangerous effects 
caused by failure of the computer), The failure of a unit can be 
automatically prevented from affecting the environment, by the 
fault-handling mechanism.
2.1.2 Criteria to be Satisfied bv FBult-^oleraiit Systems
The reliability requirements which must be imposed on a system 
naturally depend on the intended application {6]. For example, 
the primary function of information storage systems is the safe 
storage of data, so such systems can tolerate short losses of 
service, but not data loss or corruption. On the other hand, 
telephone exchanges require high availability, so that users do 
not have to wait for intolerably long periods oefore the required 
service is provided, but it doesn't necessarily matter if a few 
wrong connections are made. In the extreme case, life-critical 
systems can tolerate no failures at all.
The computer must be capable of a recovery time (the time it 
takes the system to function acceptably, after a fault) wliica 
is appropriate to the time-constant of the application (a 
measure of the speed of the system) (See fig, 3).
..S'
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FIGURE 3 - Tise Constants of Systems [4]
2;1,3 Basle Terms and Concepts
Majiy differing interpretations are placed on a number of terms 
and concepts used in the field of fault-tolerance. In order to 
avsid misinterpretation of terms used in this dissertation, the 
Bore important terms and concepts are defined below;
-  Fault - any stuto of a computer’s hardware or software 
which could cause the computer to operate incorrectly, or not 
at all
- Common-mode fault - a fault which affects all parts of the 
system simultaneously (for example, electromagnetic 
interference)
- Error - incorrect operation of tho computer, leading to 
incorrect data or to invalid actions by the computer
12
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-  Reliability - the probability that the computer will 
operate correctly during a given time period
- Fault masking - the prevention of erro 
other parts of the system
— Fault tolerance - the ability of a system t 
correctly in the presence of faults. The concept embodie
fault detection —  the discovery of a fault
- fault recovery - removal of the effects of the fault 
and isolation of the faulty system component (i.e. ensuring that, 
the component cannot exert any influence on the operation of t he \ 
system as a whole) : 1
2.1.4 Causes of Faults
In order to combat the occurrence of faults, it is 
know the way in which they arise (See fig. 4). It is often pos- ' \ ! 
sible to perform "preventative design" (this entails the 
struction of the system in such a way that susceptibility to 
faults is minimized), which will cut down on the number of 
faults that must be catered for by the fault-tolerance mechi
& !
1
,1
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ERRORS
MALFUNCTIONS,
FAULT AVOIDANCE
FIGURE 4 — Causes of Faults [7J
In essence, the origins of faults can be grouped 
categories:
- specification faults
-  implementation faults
- component failures
- external disturbances
The way in which these fault origins relate to the s 
software development cycle is shown in figure 5.
into four
:onventional
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FIGURE 5 - Conventional Software Development nnd the Origins of 
Faults [8]
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Specification faults.
The first possible cause of specification faults is that of 
hardware and software design specification mistakes, which oc­
cur when the hardware or software has been specified in a way 
that does not meet with the requirements of the system. Secondly, 
architectural mistakes mea n  that the system has been designed in 
such a- way that it is not able to perform all operations 
required of it. Finally, algorithm mistakes arise when an algo­
rithm implemented in the system is incorrect.
Implementation f a ults.
Following on from the design specifications, the system is sus­
ceptible to implementation faults. These can be the result of, 
firstly, poor design, which implies that the design of the 
hardware does not meet all the requirements of the specification. 
Otherwise, such faults can originate in poor component selection, 
where unsuitable components have been chosen. Furthermore, 
poor construction of the hardware can lead to weak points in the 
system, or software codiftg faults can lead software which does 
not always perform according to the software specifications.
Component failures.
Component failure can arise from manufacturing errors, where a 
component has been Incorrectly constructed, or from component 
flaws or component aging.
External disturbances.
Radiation is the one of the most prevalent external disturbances. 
External electromagnetic fields can alter the operation of the 
system so that it fails. Physical damage to the system can also 
occur from an external source, or unexpectedly severe environmen­
tal conditions can cause the system to fail. Finally, inap­
propriate man/machine interaction via control or maintenance
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, where the 
itrol the systi
take or i 
failure.
not qualified
Faults are classified using one or more of the following 
parameters:
-  Cause - one of the possibilities mentioned in Section 
2.1.4, which caused the fault
-  Nature - whether the fault is in the hardware or the 
software
—  Duration - whether the fault is permanent, transient or 
pseudo-transient (e.g. pattern dependent)
- Extent - the amount of the system which id affected by 
the fault
- Value - whether the errors are determinate or in­
determinate (i.e. whether the errors are always the saihe, or 
random)
Knowledge of these details enables effective counter-measures to 
be taken.
2.2 Techniques of Fnult-Tolerance
As mentioned previously, redundancy forms the basis of a fault- 
tolerant system, and this redundancy may take the form of infor­
mation redundancy, hardware redundancy, software redundancy 
and/or time redundancy. Each of these topics will be covered in 
the following sections.
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2,2.1 An Outline of Fault-Tolerance
The sequence of handling a fault begins with the detection of 
an error. The system then attempts to diagnose the fault which 
caused the error, and prevent the damage from spreading 
(confinement). Thereafter, it is necessary to reconfigure the 
system to a valid state,, bypassing the faulty components, and 
to continue operation - as fully as possible, Finally, if pos­
sible, repair to the faulty aomponent(s) should, be made, thereby 
ultimately restoring full capabilities to the system. In the se c ­
tions which follow, the various stages involved are discussed in 
depth.
Error Detection.
Faults and subsequent errors typically manifest themselves as in­
valid data. To detect errors and faults, therefore, it is neces­
sary to detect invalid data. To determine the validity of data, 
two types of test are possible:
Voting
Bounds of reason
Voting. Several answers to a calculation are obtained typically 
using one of two methods:
- repeated calculations - Each calculation (for which the 
result is to be validated), is performed two or more times. The 
answers obtained in each repetition (which may be performed by 
different processors), are compared, and any inconsistency 
reveals that an error has occurred. If executed on only one 
processor, then this technique detects the occurrence of faults 
and non-determinate faults only, since a permanent, determinate 
fault would manifest itself in the same way in each calculation, 
misleading the system Into believing that the result is valid. 
Also, if the calculations are to be run in separate processors, 
care must be taken to ensure that the executions are staggered in
18
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time so that common-mode faults do not produce the same errors in 
all processors.
duplicated calculations - Bach calculation (for which the 
result is to be validated), is performed in two or more dif­
ferent ways (possibly by different computers). Any discrepancy in 
the results indicates the occurrence of on error. All types of 
fault are covered by this method, but extra effort is required in 
development of the algorithms, and. extra program storage apace is 
needed for the different versions of the calculation.
There are two possible ways in which the answers to these cal­
culations may be compared:
hardware - Dedicated circuits ore used to compare the 
results of computations. This method is fast, but requires the 
addition of components, increasing the cost end the risk of 
failure - because of the extra components! Furthermore, in order 
for hardware voting to be used, all values of data must be simul­
taneously available. This leads to the possibility of a common­
mode fault affecting all versions of the data in the same way,
causing the voter to pass the incorrect value
- software - Voting is accomplished using a software module
Considerable effort is also required in both hardware and 
software voting to make the voting mechanism itself fault- 
tolerant .
Bounds of reason. In this technique, the value of a data ele­
ment is checked against pre-dofined limits, beyond which it is 
determined to be invalid. The test may be applied to any data 
element for which bounds of reason can be defined. The limits are 
usually characteristics of the application, or possible con­
straints imposed by the data-typing provided by the programming 
language.
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Fault diagnosis.
Faults that are to be tolerated by the system must be well 
defined, at an early stage, so that they can be specifically 
catered for in the design. Such faults must be automatically 
detected and localized by the system, using the characteristics 
of errors which have occurred, or can be made to occur, using 
diagnostic programs.
Damage Confinement.
In order to limit the effects of a fault, it must be possible to 
reset the system to a valid (correct) state after the occurrence 
of a fault, so that the system does not continue producing more 
and mor e  errors.
Reconfiguration.
The system must automatically bypass defective components and 
yet keep all system functions, which are not dependent on the 
lost component, available to the user, with: a possible
reduction in processing spaed. '
Recovery.
Data which was found to be erroneous must be corrected. Other­
wise, recovery will be in the form of resetting to a previous 
valid state (when possible), or to a predicted future state. An 
important goal In the recovery process is that every restart must 
be accomplished with a minimum recovery time, in order to mini­
mize down-time losses.
Fault Treatment and Continued service.
The system should remain in a degraded state for as short a time 
as possible. If possible, the fault should be repaired or the 
faulty unit replaced so that fault-tolerant operation is resumed.
20
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The following sections discuss the techniques used to put these 
principles into practice.
2.2.2 Information Redundancy
Information redundancy is the use of more information about the 
data than is actually needed by the application.
A widely used technique for implementing information redundancy 
is by the use of "data encoding". Numerous information-redundant 
codes have been developed to provide for detection and, in cer­
tain cases, correction of errors. A code constructed in such 
a way that any single error transforms a valid code into an in­
valid code is called a single-error detecting code. A simple form 
of such error detection is the single-bit parity check. Another 
type is "M-out-of-N" coding, where code words are N bits long, 
and always contain M ,,l"s.
A number of "checksum" arror-detaction codes exist. The 
checksum is calculated by summing the binary data that is to be 
moved from one point to another. When the data reaches its des­
tination, the checksum is recalculated, and if the new value and 
the one calculated previously do not agree, then an error is in­
dicated. These codes are useful in the transfer of blocks of
Possibly the most common extension of parity checking is the Ham­
ming error-correcting code. Hamming codes can detect double er­
rors, and correct single errors. Once a single binary error has 
been detected, it is easily corrected by complementation of the 
data bit in the identified position.
Fault-tolerant systems often incorporate information redundancy 
into the fault-tolerance mechanism, especially in the memory se c ­
tions of the system. In some cases, however, the primary fault- 
tolerance mechanisms of the system are so effective that they 
make the reliability improvement brought about by the use of in­
formation redundancy negligible.
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2.2.3 Hardware Redundancy
Hardware redundancy is the use of more physical equipment than is 
required by the application.
Hardware redundancy methods may be grouped into two categories;
- replication
- back-up
The addition of spare resources to either category results in 
what is often called an "hybrid" system.
Replication.
In the technique known as "replication", more than one resource 
is available to perform tasks required of the system. Memory, 
processing, and/or input and output units may be replicated, 
depending on the requirements of the application. All units in 
the system contribute to the operation of the system as a whole, 
and may be run out of close synchronization (where every instruc­
tion is executed at the same time in all processors) to avoid 
the effects of common-mode faults, An example of such a system is 
the Fault-tolerant Array Signal Processor (9), which uses a form 
of replication to perform space-based signal processing (See ap­
pendix 1 for more details).
Three important forms of replication are:
- dual redundant systems
- triple-modular redundant systems
- gracefully-degrading systoms
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Dual Redundant Systems. One of the simplest redundant systems is 
the dual system, in which the same tasks are executed on two dif­
ferent units, and the outputs compared. If the outputs do not 
agree, then an error is signalled. The system is incapable of 
deciding which of the two units has produced the error unless 
further testing is undertaken. This means that the system must 
be shut down when an error occurs.
Triple-modular Redundant Systems. These systems use three u n i t s , 
all performing the some calculations, and are capable of masking 
all single errors, as well as indicating which unit was respon­
sible for the error. Furthermore, the systems are capable of 
detecting simultaneous errors in all units, because the vote will 
fail. The Triplex 32 system (4] utilizes TMR (Triple Modular 
Redundancy) to accomplish fault-tolerant process control, while 
the Software Implemented Fault Tolerance [10) system applies TMR 
to aircraft control (See appendix 1 for detailed descriptions).
After a faulty unit has been pinpointed, its outputs are ignored, 
while the good units continue operation as a dual system. When 
the faulty unit has been repaired, it is -set to a state consis­
tent with the other units, and the system returns to its original 
degree of fault-tolerance.
Voting may be  accomplished in either hardware (See fig. 6), or 
in software (See fig. 7).
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VOTER
FIGURE S - Hardware Voting [4]
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FIGURE 7 - Software Voting (4)
Chapter 2 FAULT TOLERANCE - AN OVERVIEW
With voting, there is some loss of performance while data is 
passed through the voting mechanism. It is possible with hardware 
voting, however, to utilize parallel processing so that modules 
in the system are performing the next operation while the voter 
is finishing the previous one. A more serious drawback of 
hardware voting is. that the voter components are unprotected, and 
expose the system to a single-point failure. One solution is 1 to 
triplicate the voters (See fig. 8), The problem' of "common-mode 
faults is not overcome, however,^ because data must "still t e  
available to each voter at the seine time. The major advantage of 
hardware voting is its speed, especially in- fcontrol applications 
which often require large numbers of inputs and outputs.
M eV - ^ V oteX . ^ task
FIGURE 8 - Voter Triplication [5] - : '
If more than three units, are used in the system, then N-modular 
redundancy is being employed, where 'N is the number of units. 
Such replication may be used when inadequate reliability is 
provided by the triple-modular technique. There are usually an
This teohnioue is often 
1-redundant control system 
trollers or ouiuworciui computers 
to detect and recover ffotn 
through a switching 
ive and the other in reserve (
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odd number of units, so that a majority vote can always be ob­
tained.
Gracefully-degrading S y s tems. When the multiple units in a s S'Extern 
all perform different functions, then a gracefully-degrading sys­
tem can be formed. Effective load sharing 
resources, and efficient communication between the 
necessary. When a unit fails, its load is shared among 1 
u n i t s . Hence, execution time increases, but all ays 
are maintained. In addition to utilizing the technique of' 
modular redundancy, the "Software Implemented Fault-tt..
(SIFT) system also kas the ability to degrade gracefully, 
of replicated resources. Other systems vttiUsk are capable of , 
graceful degradation a re the Basic Fault-tolerant System [11] and 
the Tandem transaction processing system [12] (See appendix 1).
Back-up.
The fundamental idea behind the principle of 1 
that one unit is operational, while one or more u n i t s . 
reserve. When the active unit has failed, a replace]
Two important back-up configurati
- dual-redundancy with switch-,
- pair-and-a-spare
Dual-redundancy with 
plied in proces 
structed using 
with additional hardware 
faults. The pair is conn 
mechanism that 
fig. 9).
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odd number of units, so that a majority vote can always be ob­
tained.
Gracefully-degrading Systems. When the multiple units in a system 
all perform different functions, then a gracefully-degrading sys­
tem can be formed. Effective load sharing across system 
resources, and efficient communication between the units are 
necessary. When a unit fails, its load is shared among the other 
units. Hence, execution time increases, but all system functions 
are maintained. In addition to utilizing the technique of triple 
modular redundancy, the "Software Implemented Fault-tolerance" 
(SIFT) system also has the ability to degrade gracefully, because 
of replicated resources. Other systems which are capable of 
graceful degradation are the Basic Fault-tolerant System [ H I  and 
the Tandem transaction processing system [12] (See appendix 1).
Back-up.
The fundamental idea behind the principle of back-up systems is 
that one unit is operational, while one or more units, wait in 
reserve. When the active unit has failed, a replacement takes
Two important back-up configurations are:
- dual-redundancy with switch-over
- pair-and-a-spare
Dual-redundancy with Switch-over. This technique is often ap ­
plied in process control. A dual-redundant control system is con­
structed using two process controllers or commercial computers, 
with additional hardware and software to detect and recover from 
faults. The pair is connected to the process through a switching 
mechanism that keeps one active and the other in reserve (See 
fig. 9).
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PROCESS
FIGURE 9 - The Dual-Redundant Configuration [4]
The active computer executes both a control program for the ap­
plication, and a diagnostic program that continually checks 
for errors in the processing unit, memory and I/O circuits. 
When an error is detected, the switching mechunism transfers con­
trol to the reserve computer, which will have been passively 
monitoring the process. The Agusta 129 helicopter flight control 
system is an example of such b a ck-up, as is the Resilient trans­
action processing system. These are covered in soma detail in ap­
pendix 1.
For fast processes, several problems make this method unsuitable. 
The first problem is that errors may occur before the diagnostic 
program can detect that something is wrong. Secondly, the 
switching time at computer change-over may be too long, causing 
an unacceptable discontinuity in the control values. Finally, 
the switching mechanism could f ail, causing complete loss of c on­
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trol. When such fast processes are to be controlled, techniques 
that provide fault-masking must be used.
Pair-and-a-spare. In the pair-and-a-spare configuration, four 
identical modules are organized as primary and shadow pairs of 
master and checker modules (See fig. 10).
INPUT
FIGURE 10 - The Quad-Modular Redundant Configuration (5)
Only the primary’s master module is capable of activating the 
computer outputs. While the primary's master transmits data, its 
checker modulo compares external data and that presented to its 
disabled output drivers (See fig. 11). This technique is called 
"functional redundancy checking". If the primary's checker module 
detects an error, it initiates a procedure that disables the 
primary pair, and enables the shadow pair to take over the 
primary rote. Systems which apply this technique ore the Stratus 
transaction processing system and the Intel 432 general-purpose 
system (See appendix 1 for more details).
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FIGURE 11 -  Functional redundancy Checking (G)
Hybrid.
The essence of the hybrid system is the availability of spare 
units to replace those that are faulty. Spares can be provided 
for any system in which the faulty unit con bo identified. The 
purpose of providing spares is to ensure that the system is 
returned to its original fault-tolerant state with the minimum of 
delay. The failed unit can then be removed for repair.
2.2.4 Software Redundancy
Software redundancy is the use of more software then is required 
by the application.
Software redundancy can range from the addition of small routines 
to perform validity checks on the data, to full replication of
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all software (i.e. more than one complete software system), writ­
ten by different programming teams.
There are reany possible approaches to implementing redundancy in 
software, differing mainly in complexity. Validity checks are 
the simplest; in this approach, the values of key variables 
in calculations are monitored to pick up any deviation from 
the range of values that ■ the variables may have,
Redundant software may be used to perform periodic testing of 
hardware, by  applying algorithms to pre-defined data with known 
results, If erroneous results are produced by the, hardware, then 
that particular piece of equipment is signalled as faulty.
Full replication of software may be used as. a  means to avoid er­
ror propagation, using voting. Identical copied of the software 
may be run concurrently in different processors (thereby includ­
ing hardware redundancy as well), and the results compared. 
However, global faults such as electromagnetic interference may 
cause the same error to occur in all sets of the software. For 
this reason, the execution of the software may be staggered 
slightly in time, so that the same error is npt induced in all 
copies of the program.
An expensive, but potentially reliable way of replicating 
software is to hove different design teams each produce the 
programs knowing only the functional requirements of the system. 
This may even be taken so far as to have the teams use different 
programming languages. In this way, it is unlikely that the same 
code will be produced, and it will also be unlikely that the 
same programming mistakes will bo made. Hence both common-mode 
errors and software errors have a greater probability of detec­
tion when such a system is in use.
Software may be used to perform the voting involved in 
hardware redundant systoms. Bach computer receives the same in­
puts, computes a result, and sends it to the other com­
puters, receiving their answers in return. The majority voted
30
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result is the used for output. This approach is known as SIFT 
[10], and will be discussed laker.
Another software-redundant fault-tolerance technique, called 
"check-pointing", is used in some loosely-coupled systems, in 
which duplicated processors run the software at approximately the 
same time, but not wit h  step-by-step synchronization. Software in 
these systems can periodically suspend normal program execution 
while each system compares its state with the state(s) of its 
companion(s) to determine if an error has occurred since the last 
check-point. If no error is detected, then the system saves its 
current state, and operation resumes. If an error is detected, 
then each system is "rolled back" to the previous (recorded) 
error-free state, and processing continues from that point. If 
the same error is detected at the next check-point, the failure 
is diagnosed as permanent.
2.2.5 Time Redundancy
Time redundancy is simply the use of more time than is needed to 
perform only the functions required by the application. All the 
fault-tolerance techniques already discussed involve the use of 
time redundancy:
- information-redundant systems must always perform checks to 
see if the data has to be corrected. Even if these checks 
are performed in hardware, some delay occurs. If correction is 
needed, then further delay is required
- hardware-:tidundant systems also perform correctness 
tests when they reach the voting stages of the each p r o cess, 
so that time redundancy is also evident here
- software-redundant systems can require many times the normal 
execution time if the entire software system is replicated. If 
only small diagnostic routines are used, then only a small in­
crease in execution time will be necessary
Chapter 2 FAULT TOLERANCE - AN OVERVIEW
Tine redundancy can be used to aid in the determination of the 
nature of a fault; by  repeating a calculation, it is possible 
to distinguish between permanent and transient f a ults.
2.3 Evaluation of Appropriate Fault-tolerance Techniques
Evaluation of systems is necessary to determine their suitability 
for a - particular application. It is clear that a wide range of 
techniques are available for incorporation into the design of a 
specific fault tolerant computer system. It is naturally impor­
tant to weigh up the various attributes of each approach and the 
trade-offs in a particular application. Generally, it is apparent 
that, as in all engineering, both qualitative and quantitative 
factors must be considered.
Qualitative comparisons describe trade-off issues and specific 
benefits of one technique or design over another. These are fac­
tors that can not be given numerical values, and can include:
- verifiability - the ability to determine that a system 
design performs the functions required of it
testability - the ability to determine that a system is 
operating as it was designed to operate. Additional fei 
usually incorporated to make the system testable
flexibility - the ability of a system to be used in many 
different application environments
Additional points which are considered in system evaluatio
- faults that are covered by the system
- applications supported by the system
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- technology - the capabilities of, and requirements for the 
system depend on the technology used
2.3.2 Quantitative Evaluation
Quantitative evaluation techniques derive values for (7];
„ fault coverage 
handling all faults
the probability of detecting and
- reliability - the probability of survival in the 
span (to ,t], given that the system was operational at to
availability 
available at time t
the probability that the system is
Numerous quantitative measures are taken into consideration in 
the above evaluations, including {13]:
- mean time to first failure
- mean time between failure
- mean down Lime
- availability
- computation reliability
- computation availability
- average computation to first failure
- average computation between failures
Also important in the evaluation of a technique are:
- performance - including throughput and response times
- cost - including purchasing price, maintenance cost mid , 
plication engineering cost
Two widely used quantitative system evaluation techniques
- combinatorial modelling
- Markov modelling (See fig. 12)
a  <8*6. «u .i». ^  £wNlef«rlGe -
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FIGURE. 12 - A Markov Model [7]
2.4 'Summary
The concept of fault-tolerance arises from the need to cater for _ 
the occurrence of faults in computer systems. Different applica­
tions require different aspects of the system to be made secure 
against the effect of faults.
The core principle, around which the sequence of fault-handling 
events is built, is that of redundancy. This redundancy may take 
the form of information redundancy, hardware redundancy, software 
redundancy and/or time redundancy.
In order to compare tin relative merits of different 
tolerant systems, a number of evaluation measures, both q 
tive and quantitative, have been developed.
f a u l t -  
l a l i t a -
It is evident that a major portion of many fault-tolerant systoms 
is the software which provides fault-tolerance functions. It is 
clearly necessary that this software be as reliable us possible, 
so that it does not diminish the reliability of the system as a 
whole. The next chapter gives a brief coverage of the techniques 
of good software design, or software engineering.
Chapter 3 - SOFTWARE DEVELOPMENT TECHNIQUES
A major aspect in the production of any fault-tolerant computer 
system is clearly the development of reliable, well defined 
software. In view of thi s , relevant software development tech­
niques are examined in this chapter.
The application of conventional development practices to software 
design has been shown [14] to lead to a 20% - SOX rule for the 
division of resources between definition and coding (20*) and 
testing and maintenance (SOX), The lack of appropriate software 
design and development tools may lead to unstructured, poorly 
documented, and error-prone programs which are difficult to un­
derstand and expensive to maintain [14]. The increasing com­
plexity and extent of applications of computers has reinforced 
the need for improved software development techniques-
However, with the application of modern software engineering 
practices, reductions in software c o sts, increases in 
programmers' productivity and reductions in error frequency of 
between 25* and 75* have been observed. Experiments indicate that 
the application of more systematic management, design and 
development techniques may lead to a 40* - 20* - 40* rule for the 
division of resources between definition/design, coding, and 
testing/maintenance respectively [14].
3.2 Structured Design
3.2.1 Design Methodologies
As applied to programming, design methodology consists of [15] 
- establishing the definition of the problem
- specifying the data objects the software must manipulate
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specifying the operations that correspond to the 
manipulation of the data objects
specifying the programs which must . operate, on the 
defined data objects
In order to control tne complexity of the development sequence, 
it is necessary that specifications are initially represented in 
an abstract form* leading to the-adoption of formal specification 
systems.
3.2.2 Design Principles - OverView
The four major design principles are [IS], [14]:
Specification —  identification of all' the function^ that the 
design oust provide. Specifications formally define thR<functions 
and properties that a designed system must have. forRaliaed 
specifications are derived from the external requirements of the 
system. \
Complexity decomposition - a structured organization of intellec­
tually manageable steps or components of the design. The struc­
ture of an entity is given when the relationships between its 
components have been identified. The most widely accepted notion 
of modern programming techniques is the introduction of good 
structure into program and data design.
'Guided design. A constrained and controlled process of construc­
tion of the design. The construction model consists of three 
rules which govern the development process;
A program cannot be functionally specified until all its 
requirements are known
- The program’s algorithm cannot be derived until the func­
tional specifications are known
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: The environment for programs and objects form conditions
which in turn may generate requirements through data type 
specifications to be satisfied by a lower level development step
Proof of correctness. Ideally, a proof bhoul^ be possible for 
every program design and every data representation„to ensure the 
design is consistent with its specifications. At present?;'.^
however, it is accepted that this goal is not practically at­
tainable. Two types of proof are needed
- Proof of the program text • - ,
- Proof of the data representation
Proof is considerably aided by  good documentation structure and 
the use of formalized specifications throughout t b V  design 
sequence [15].
3.3 Structured Programming
It is clear that the easiest systems to maintain are those 
built up from manageably small m o d ules, each of which is, as far 
as possible, independent of the others. This allows them to be 
taken out of the system, changed, and put bach in the system 
without affecting t he rest of the systems
In such a system, each module has its own job, which it performs 
only when given orders from above; it communicates only with 
its invoking module and With its invoked modules, to Which it 
will, in turn, issue orders.
A good design therefore has the least possible coupling -between 
m o d ules. Three types of coupling have been defined [16]: ,
i
!
5
■ ?
'ii
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Data coupling. Data is passed as part of the invocation of the 
module and aa part of returning control to the invoker. The cou­
pling is improved if aa few data exchanges as possible are used.
Ihia coupling has been found to be the best type.
Control coupling. In this fora of coupling, status reports are 
passed between the invoking module and the called module, 
causing changes in the control pattern. This type of exchange 
should be kept to a minimum, for ease of understanding rf program 
flow, and hence easier maintenance.
Bxternal/content/patbological coupling. This coupling arises 
when the execution of a module depends extensively on another
module. Such coupling should be avoided, because of the confusion
it can create in understanding of the program.
Cohesion,
A  highly cohesive module, whose parts all contribute to a single 
function, is not likely to need much coupling to other modules. 
Six types of cohesion have been identified. From the worst to the 
best, they1- are [16]
Coincidental cohesion. The elements of the module cannot be 
seen as achieving any definable function.
Logical cohesion. Several similar functions are combined into one 
m o d u l e .
Temporal cohesion. A variety of functions, which are executed at 
the same time, are combined into one module^
Procedural cohesion. Each chxink or procedure of a flowchart has 
been built into the same module.
Communications! cohesion. All functions in the module operate on 
the same data stream.
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Functional cohesion. The module carries out one identifiable 
function.
Structured programming involves coding programs using a limited 
number of control structures to form highly cohesive units of 
code that are easily readable, and therefore more easily tested, 
maintained arid modified than Conventional programs.
M any tools which aid in program development are available. The 
prime tools ore:
- The structure principle
- Specification extraction
-  Tree structure diagrams
-  Pseudo-code
3.3.1 Structure Theorem and Conventions [17]
The structure theorem states that any proper program (a 
program with one entry and one exit) is equivalent to a 
program that contains as control structures only
-  sequences of two or more operations
conditional branches to one of two operations (IF 
condition x THEN action a ELSE action b)
- repetition of an operation while a condition is true (DO 
WHILE condition x)
A large and complex program may be developed by the £ y - " 
propriate nesting of these three basic structures withir. each 
other. The logic flow of such a program always proceeds from the 
beginning to the end without arbitrary branching.
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Two useful extensions to the three structures are
- DO U-MTIL condition X
- DO CASE condition x
Several conventions are included as a supporting part of 
structured programming. For example, strict attention is 
paid to the indentation of the control structures on the printed 
page, so that logical relationships in the coding correspond 
to the physical position on the listing, Code is segmented into 
reasonable amounts (normally one segment or function per 
page). Segmentation continues down through the entire coding 
process.
The use of structured programming, should provide m any 
benefits, including fewer errors in the programming process, 
programs that are nearly self-documenting, and code that can be 
more easily read, modified and maintained.
K critical area in the design process is th4 establishment of 
the correct specification for the system. All design stems 
from this specification, so any errors or omissions will be 
propagated from it, into the final system. Two tools aid in the 
correct specification of the systemi
- decision trees
- decision diagrams 
Decision Trees. [16}
Decision trees are used as a tool to extract the correct deci­
sion logic from ambiguous specificoli.ons.
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The technique is to
"unless", "however", "but",, 
than/less than ambiguities, 
defined adjectives. This establishes areas which must be cleared 
up by the intended usor of the system. Once clarification 
has been completed, a revised specification narrative is
produced, and a decision tree is drawn up {See fig. 13).
identify conditions, 
structures, 
and/or ambiguities,
actions, 
greater 
and un-
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FIQURR 13 - A Decision Tree (16) 
Decision Diagrams. fi6]
Decision diagrams (See fig. 
possibilities for every i 
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01-condition 1 Y N N N*
C2-condition 2 M Y N N
C3-condition 3 y N Y N Y N Y N
Al-action 1 X X X X
A2-ection 2 X X X x “
distinct values for each 
condition
-action not taken 
-action token
' ' \
Si-v. ^4 - A Decision Diagram {16] ")
3.3.41Tyee Structure Diatframa [18]
A useful, graphic representation of a structured system is the 
tree structure diagram. A graphic representation allows easier 
visualization of the system, enabling the designer to more 
readily see improvements Lo the structure. Using this system, 
nodes on the diagram are phown as rectangles, such os those which 
follow: . /
a  a object B or object C
□
□
repeated object D
the null object
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Cl-condition 1 Y Y N
C2-condition 2 Y N N
C3-condition 3 |y N Y N Y N Y N
Al-action 1 jx X X
A2-action 2 [ X X X X"
> "'T/there may be more than two
distinct values for each
condition
-action not taken 
- action taken
FIGURE 14 - A Decision Diagram [16]
3.3.4 Tree Structure Diagrams [18]
A useful graphic representation of a structured system is the 
tree structure diagram. A graphic representation allows easier 
visualization of the system, enabling the designer to more 
readily see improvements to the structure. Using this system, 
nodes on the diagram are shown as rectangles, such os those which 
follow:
0
□
□
□
object A
I. C I object B or object C
repeated object D
the null object
£
m e c t e d  in i
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tree structure which indicates the 
An example is shown in figure 15.
FIGURE 15 - A Tree Structure Diagram (18J
3.3.5 Pseudo-code
The primary purpose of pseudo-code is to enable an in­
dividual to express his thoughts in a form that uses native 
language prose, but expresses the control flow of the program in 
an unambiguous manner. Pseudo-code acts as a form of program 
documentation which is easy to maintain and nut exceaaivbly time- 
consuming to produce,
"Structured words", such os IP, DO UNTIL etc., and in­
dentation rules, are used to show control dependency. Natural 
language phrases are used to express thoughts [17].
!: ”  i f  ' ! ’
" ,  V
Chapter 3 SOFTWARE DEVELOPMBNT TECHNIQUES
3.4 Data Flow
3.4.1 .
Data flow is the technique of connecting the functions of a sys­
tem only by flows of the data within the system. Functions con­
nected by data flow are not dependent on adjacent functions [19]. 
An independent job step can execute as long as its input data is 
available and it can dispose of its output data 
that the program is easy to maintain.
(See appendix 2 for a more detailed description)
3.4.2 The uso of Data Flow Techniques
The basic tool for utilizing data flow is the data flow diai 
A standard set of Symbols is used to represent the flow of 
through the elements of a system. The set includes:
- functions - processes which operate on the data
- flows of data
- stores of data
external i or sinks of data
Data dictionaries 
elements in the sya
to provide standard descriptions of
To get from a data flov diagram to an hierarchical structure, one 
starts with the rawest form of input and traces it through the 
data flow until the point is reached where it can no longer be 
said to be input. Likewise, the output is traced back into the 
system until it can no longer be thought of as output. The middle 
piece of the system forms the transformation section.
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Tree structure diagrams are used to represent the hierarchical 
system.
3.5 T o d  Down Deslrtn
Traditionally, top-down development involved the ordering of 
development, in each design phase, from the highest level to the 
lowest level, as shown in figure 16.
PHASES
1 111 -> 1 | e-,g. requirements definition
[H -> t I functional specification
IH  ->  L | e t c .
FIGURE 16 - Traditional Top-Down Development 120}
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Recently, a modified approach to top-down system development has 
been proposed [20]. The new approach essentially combines top- 
down and bottoin-up development,
- i.
Using the now approac^., top-down design is defined as the tech­
nique of producing a crude skeleton vocftion of a system, then ad­
ding and testing more complexity, piece by piece (See fig. 17) 
121]. -
Course end fine versions of the system are developed in turn- 
This allows phases to ryn in parallel, since design teams do not 
usually concern themselves with phases in the development other 
than the one in which tHjey specialize.
FIGURE 17 - Revised Top-Down D e v o u r m e n t  [HO]
With revised top-down development, the highest level of a system 
is coded and tested first. Since this unit will normally invoice 
lower level units, dummy coda must bo substituted temporarily for
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them. Once the higher levels have'been Completed, work proceeds 
down the hierarchy until all coding is done.
The major advantage in top-down development is that it avoids the 
problem of interfacing many small modules. Also, it allows users 
to see reduced versions of the system go that they can offer uom- 
aents at an early stage.
The quality of a system produced in this manner should be  in­
creased through earlier detection and elimination of design 
problems and coding errors [17).
;
3.6 Verification and Validation
The main objectives of the verification and validation ; 
are the identification and solving of software problems etpd, high- 
risk issues aa early in the software life cycle as possible^,
3.6.1 ;
Verification - "The process of determining whether 
products of a giveR phase of the software developraei 
fil the requirements established in the previous pha: [ 2 2 ] .
Validation - "The process of evaluating software at the end of 
the software development process to ensure compliance with 
software requirements" [22].
3.6.2 Verification and Validation Criteria
The criteria are shown in figure 18, overleaf
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r— Co'taple-te^
— Consistent^
Satisfactory 
Software - 
Specification
^No to-be~determineds
non-existent references 
-No missing spec, items 
■~No raissitig functions 
s No missing products
^•Internally 
— Externally 
"^Tracedble
Human Engineering 
Resource Engineering 
•Program Engineering
Technical 
Cost Schedule 
Environment 
Interaction
Specific
Unambiguous
Quantitative
NOTES:
— Consistency implies that a specification's provisions do not 
conflict with one another or with governing specifications and 
objectives. The specifications should be traceable so that misin­
terpretations and embellishments are avoided.
- If high-risk issues a 
likelihood of disaster.
not identified, then there is
FIGURE 18 - Satisfactory Software Specification [22]
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uas [22]
Although manual techniques for verification and validation 
p r e vail, there is increasing development of automatic tools 
which improve the speed, reliability and consistency of the 
checking processes.
Manual techniques. These techniques may take the form of
- reading by someone other than the originator
- manual cross-referencing
- interviews with the originator of the specification
- checklists
- manual modelling in defined environments
- mathematical proofs
Automatic techniques. These may take the form of -
-  automated cross-referencing.
-  automated modelling
- prototypes
3.7 Debugging [23]
It is almost certain that, 
software development pro 
completed system.
will
rigourous
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The debugging process consists, in essence, of the following?
■ - describing the error
- (*) gathering data about the p r o gram’s behaviour
- hypothesizing about the cause of the error, and taking steps 
to remedy it ;
- testing the hypothesis .';l
- if the hypothesis did not work, then the processes is 
repeated from step (*)
(See appendix 3 for more details).
3.8 Summary
The use of modern software design techniques improves the quality 
of the software which is produced. , ^
A number of techffigueg may be applied to improve the software 
design process. The most useful technique is that of , struc­
tured design, as adapted for programming. , „t
The steps involved while applying the technique of ^structured 
programming consist of:
complete and accurate specification of the required
software
- decomposition of the specification into manageable stejis
- controlled construction of the software
- proof of the correctness of the software
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At the end of each stage in the development, the results of the 
stage are verified (shown to follow from the results of (he 
previous stage), and at the end of the design process, the 
Software is validated (shown to comply with the software 
requirements).
Having now covered both an investigation into fault-iolerance, 
and a study of software development, t h e : following chapter 
describes the experimental system produced to afcdL-inithe srtudy of 
fault-tolerance techniques. - > *
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4.1 introduction
One of the prime objectives of this project was to produce a 
flexible experimental aysteo which could bo used to study various 
fault-tolerance techniques. In order to demonstrate its opera­
tional effectiveness, the system was to perform, elementary real­
time control of a servo system.
The possibility of constructing a system which utilized hardware 
to perform fault-tolerance functions was ruled out, for two main 
reasons
—  Special processor boards would have to be developed, or ad­
ditional boards would have to be designed to provide the 
aechanism for fault tolerance. This would require excessive addi­
tional effortt and not take advantage of the hardware available 
from commercial sources.
- It was clear that thoroughly tested commercial processor 
boards would be superior to any rapidly designed, yet complex, 
new hardware.
For these reasons, and for the obvious reason of flexibility, it 
was decided that the fault-tolerance functions would be imple­
mented in software.
The path taken in the development of th« system was to select a 
promising fault-tolerant architecture, and to use that as a basis 
from which other fault-toleran't configurations could be built 
through minor alterations to the software.
It was decided that the triple modular configuration was ap­
propriate, mainly in view of several characteristics displayed by 
the system (as described in chapter 2) [24].
However, the software was designed and coded in a sufficiently 
modular form for small modifications to produce other system 
configurations.
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The designed system provides a number of facilities fpv the■rftolerance of faults (See fig. 19)
- Task I/O voting '
" ' /  , '
- Self and mufcsfal testing „ ; c
- Time s t a g g t o p e r a t i o n  ^  '
- Device operation validation
-  Watchdog timing
- Fault handling *
These will be discussed iq detail in the following sections.
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FIGURE 19 - System Description
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4,2 Detailed System Description
The physical part of the experimental system is tocate.cl- in a ' 12- 
card Multibus-compatible rack, although provision is ^ made"for the 
nodes ultimately to be in separate racks < so improving 
reliability. This facility is accomplished by. using a "model" of 
the MIL-STD-1553B bus communication standard for - t&fjar-node com­
munication. The model is implemented in ^ he',Vlexperii^4ntal system 
using an additional processor and common memo r y L Ifence, for1 the 
processing nodes to be separated, bus interface controllers need 
to be provided* and the software slightly -modif i .
' ' ■ /  " • '
The processing nodes in t he experimental system each^ contain an
elementary operating system which controls tho./execution of tasks 
and t he fault-iolerance facilities. The operating system ensures 
that tasks are run at the correct time, tha^/they run to comple­
tion , and that test tasks are invoked ,wheii there is sufficient 
timet ■ - ■ j j  '
In addition to task contc'11), thR operating ays tern provides a  num­
ber of optional routiifW % a t  the application tasks can .use to 
perform fault-tolerant iti1^ -: -Output, a/td memory access. Routines 
for scheduling and desch@dulj.ng tasks ire available.
These additional routines C a ^ ^ a  used as Required by the applica­
tion design. This provides tib i'Evcility for choosing an accept­
able execution time overhead, balanced against gains in 
reliability. „ •
Each aspect of the system is introduced below.
4.2.1 Task I/O Voting
Task I/O voting is the most important of the fault tolerance 
measures, and since the system is to be used in a critical con­
trol environment, it must provide correct outputs at all times. 
In order to establish the validity of the outputs, it is neces­
sary to have not only a means of comparison between proposed out­
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puts, but also a means for determining the correct output. Hence 
three versions of critical outputs are produced, and by ensuring 
that at least the majority of the processors agree on an output 
value, the chance of an incorrect output clearly becomes very
. ( .
When a task requires an input, it requests the correct value from 
the operating system. The operating system routine ascertains 
which type of data (input from external devices, input front pre­
vious calculations, or permanently .stored data) has been 
requested, end executes an appropriate subroutine to provide the 
correct value. In the case of sehsor inputs, the jjibroutine may 
be required to perform sensor operation phec ] ^  'before it returns 
an input value. These take the form ijftdicated in the device 
operation validation section (4.2.4). If tf^e required data is in 
RAM, then the subroutine writes the corrects.data into any loca­
tion found to have the incorrect valuer. A  two-out-of-three vote 
is applied whenever there are three Values available.
Similarly, when a task has to output a vaj^ae, it requests the 
operating syste.* to perform the dgtq validity checks and perform 
the actual output operation (See fi#. 20, overleaf).
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V
APPLICATION OPERATING SYSTEM
Testing
Application 
Task Schedule
Local Processing 
Input Request
Obtain Data 
Vote
Processing 
Output Request
Obtain Data 
Vote
Perform Output 
Validate
Testing
FIGURE 20 - Task I/O Voting
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The voting operation provides three important pieces of informa­
tion. Firstly, an error is signalled soon after its occurrence, 
allowing the operating system to begin appropriate action. 
Secondly, the erroneoun information is marked as such, and can be 
regarded with suspicion if it has to be used for further calcula­
tions. Finally, the faulty node is identified, and can be ignored 
until it has been shown to be usable by the operating system.
There la a small possibility that two or all three of the proces­
sors will fail, and produce incorrect output values. When this 
happens, the voting mechanism indicates that it is inpapable of 
resolving the dispute, and the operating ^system attempts to 
validate the system before it allows normal operation to con-
There is also a possibility that results submitted for voting 
have an accuracy tolerance, that is to say-,., they may be slightly, 
but acceptably, incorrect. Such a situaMoit may arise, for In­
stance, when a task running in a node gets Its input values from 
more than one sensor, causing them to be a little different. In 
such c a ses, it is necessary that the voting mechanism flags a 
fault only when tho three submitted values ere unacceptably dif­
ferent from each other. For this purpose, e^ch data element has a 
tolerance value associated with it. The tolerance value is con­
sidered to be zero in the default case token, none is specified, 
so that such a value need only be assigned to those data elements 
where ine actnesa is tolerable.
4.2*2 Self and Mutual Testing
Self- and mutual-testing of the processors helps to idyntify a 
faulty processor when a dispute arises. Such testing is also usfid 
to forestall the occurrence of a dispute by indicating a fault 
before a task is undertaken by tho processor.
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The testing is done in two pircumetances. Firstly, testing is 
done whenever the processors are idle. This can provide advance 
warning of pending execution errors. Secondly, testing is under­
taken when the operating system decides that it is necessary. 
Such an operation will occur when the operating system is to 
validate an input, dr when a fault is detected, but the operating 
system is Unsure of its originating processor, or wishes to make 
a more detailed diagnosis of the fault.
A  number of subsystems are tested, in particular, the memory, the 
processor, the I/O equipment and the ititer-node communication 
equipment, e s w e l l  as any s p e c i a l i z e d  equipment the node has." 
Some of this testing is written in machine code to maintain tight 
control over the system resources.
Self-testing is intended to find faults in the physical com­
ponents of the computer system (See appendix 4). Algorithm faults 
and programming mistakes must be removed using conventional 
debugging techniques.
Error and Fault Detection.
It is clear that tests may'be devised to detect virtually any er­
ror or fault. The question of which tests provide a significant 
improvement in reliability, against the resource'usage required, 
has to be carefully considered before including any of them.
Various criteria establish the usefulness of a particular test, 
such as:
i - the probability that the type of malfunction which the test 
is designed to detect will actually occur, and the probability of 
its detection and correction using a particular technique
ii - the probable damage that could be caused by the malfunction
lii - the cost of additional storage and increased computing 
power requirements to include the test in the system
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Testing in the Experimental System
A form of hybrid testing is utilized in the system discussed 
here. The system is functionally partitioned, and exercised 
using a set,of pseudo-random numbers aa data. If time permits 
(i.e. if the processor workload is / j ^ o w ) t h i s  method tends 
toward the pseudo-exhaustive method,,. since the probability 
that all combinations of data and control have. _,epn tried 
tends to 1.
Processor Testing. The first items to be tested are the core in­
structions ot the processor, namely 1 ^
-  memory to register transfer.
- register to register comparison
- conditional branch
Next, instruction tests are performed, testing all pos­
sible processor instructions. Two methods are possible
- recomputation of a result by a different method, and com­
parison of the two results. Pseudo-random data is ustid.
computation using known data, with pre-computed answers 
available for comparison
Memory Testing. Once it has been established that the processor 
is functioning correctly, testing of the memory sub-system 
proceeds.
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The memory testing procedure is as follows:
A block of memory is transferred to a temporary storage
location. The copy is checked against the original to see
if any error has occurred in the transfer.
—  Pseudo-random numbers are generated and written into tbe 
block of memory to be tested, . as well as another temporary 
storage area. These data are compared. The test can show . 
up pattern dependent faults.
—  A  sequence of "sliding ones" is written into the block 
and read back. This technique ia included in addition to the 
use of  random numbers because it shows up both "stuck at" faults 
and cross-coupling faults, which are common types of memory
- The original data is copied back to the memory block,
and this is again checked against the duplicate.
Input and Output Device Testing. It was necessary to write 
specific test programs for the I/O facilities attached to the 
system.
Two situations are possible when testing input and output:
- Testing may be allowed to affect the devices at­
tached to the output facility.
This situation is normally applicable only when the system is 
not in use, i.e. before it begins to execute application 
tasks. Tests which affect the attached devices are therefore 
normally run as pre-application system acceptance tests. The 
testa are able tti fully exercise the output and input
capabilities of the I/O facility, performing both readback and 
feedback tests if possible.
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- Testing is not allowed to affect the devices at­
tached to the I/O facility.
In this casei only limited testing is possible, such as writing 
to and reading from control registers without activating them,
and testing input devices. It is also possible to produce small 
output variations if the resolution of the system is such that 
output is possible without being detrimental to the performance 
of the plant.
Communication System Testing. Special test programs were needed 
to test the communication system. Once again, the system may or 
may not be permitted to affect the otitpp*-,j>f^be: communications 
interface board.
It is possible to arrange the estab,, ^ ^ n t  of a com­
munications link with another node j^or testing purposes
only. In this case, the testing consists o£ passing known 
messages back and forth along the link, as well as the use 
of pseudo-random messages. All capabilities of the 15535 
facility are tested.
Tests of other peripheral equipment need to be developed as ap­
propriate for each additional item.
Mutual Testing. For the purposes of mutual testing, a node in­
structs another node as to the test(s) it must perform, and 
monitors the results. This provides added protection against the 
possible misinterpretation of test results due to faults in the
Application-Dependent Tests. Tests which are built into the ap­
plication programs may be included, at the discretion of the 
programmer. Such tests con include
- recoraputation if data by the same, an inverse or a different 
process, and comparison of the results
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tests to see if results satisfy mathematical or physical
- checks based on estimates of
^ special tests for a particular
Acceptance Testa. Acceptance tests for the system consist of a 
more comprehensive set of t e sts, plus the more exhaustive use of 
the standard t e sts. The acceptance tests are run as part of the 
preparation of the system for use.
Test Control.
The test control routines have two Sanctions
- scheduling of tests
- maintenance of test records
Under no-error conditions, a standard routine of testing is 
followed and test records are updated.
When an error is detected, either by the seif-test routines or by 
other methods, an attempt is made to establish the cause of the 
error. This is done by a systematic narrowing-down process, using 
the self-tests available. An error record, plus a fault record 
where appropriate, a;
Because of the noisy environment in which the system may operate, 
there is a high possibility of transient faults caused by inter­
ference such as power spikes and electromagnetic noise. To mini­
mize the effects of such interference, time-staggered < 
of tasks in the three processors is used. Although the pr 
are executing the same task at any time, this staggering , 
that code instructions are not executed simultaneously,
» .Ve-iC* . i
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therefore cannot be affected in the same way by common-mode in­
terference. Errors in the results of all the tasks may occur, but 
they will be different, and therefore detectable.
Setting up of skew is necessary in two circumstances, namely 
at system power-up, and when a processor must be brought back 
into operation after f%u%t recovery.
Since voting is done in software, there is no necessity for the 
processors to b* brought into synchronization for this purpose. 
Results for voting are accessed by another processor, via the 
asynchronous comraunioation system, When it is ready to do so.
There are two ways of maintaining time-staggered operation:
Staggered execution.
When using staggered execution (See fig. 21), all system clocks 
are synchronized to the same "clock-time*1, and each task 
begins at a different clock-time. This method requires that 
all task scheduling operating system calls are intercepted 
and modified to the new execution time, particular to each 
n o d e , or that the task scheduling routine is rewritten to inr 
elude a different correction factor for each node. Alternatively, 
all task scheduling calls must be written to include the 
different execution times. This implies different software for 
different n o des.
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System i 
Clock 0
Clock
Tick
TASK Y
FIGURE 21 - Staggered Execution of Tasks 
Staggered Clocks.
In the staggered clock method (See fig. 22), all system clock 
are synchronized to the same clock-time, and are then stag 
: by the required amount. This means that the clock-time fo 
ode is different.
'IV-
■■
/" • :
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TASK X
Proc C l  i
Clock 2 3 4 5
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FIGURE 22 - Staggered Clocks
fit this system, it is titifc hbcessary to intercept task scheduling 
calls or to rewrite the scheduling routines, because automatic 
staggering of execution times ocdxtcs.
This means that software can be exactly duplicated in all nodes. 
The node identification determines its clock-alagger position.
4.2.4 Qavlce .Operation Validation
Routines arti provided to test the state of the output devices, 
os well as monitor the state of input devices. The output 
devices are tested by reading back the outputs sent to them 
to see if there is any discrepancy.
WheiTO input devices are replicated, the values returned by them 
are compared, and a note made of any discrepancies.
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Where replication 4a not present, the values returned are
cheeked for reasonableness iand consistency.
Output Device Validation.
An output channel is defined, for the purposes of this report,, 
according to figtire 23.
channel
•outputSystem
readback
A/P
FIGURE 23 - An Output Channel i
li ■
Either or both of «khe A/ll converters m ay be absent from the out­
put channel# /
Two types of dcvi&e operation validation are possible:
Readback. By reading hock the output applied to the device 
by the I/O board, the system determines whether an output cir­
cuit fault hua occurred. This may be either due to a fault on 
the I/O board, or a fault at the device inputs. In either case, 
the output channel has failed. It is possible, by examining the 
value of the incorrect output, to identify the type of fault - 
open circuit, short circuit or in between, but this is im­
material as the device is no longer usable .in any case.
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Feedback. If the readback signal is correct, then it is still 
possible for the device to have failed in some area other 
than the input circuit (such as a mechanical section). In this 
case, the feedback signal is diffe>^nt from that which can be 
predicted from the device choraetJrietics.
Because the feedback signal to be expected is dependent on the 
nature of the application* it is up to the application program to 
provide checks on the feedback signal. An expected value is 
provided to the operating system whenever an output is requested, 
enabling it to decide whether an error has occurred.
If the feedback sensor itself has failed, producing invalid read­
ings, this registers as an output channel failure because no con­
trol is possible.
An I/O data table is kept, informing the system of the con­
figuration of each output channel. The table is consulted 
whenever output is to be performed.
If the device i# such that readback of output values is not 
useful, then the table informs the operating system accordingly, 
and no readback is made. If readback is provided, then read-back 
testing is done whenever an output- is sent to the device. 
Tests utilizing readback can also be made when no other tasks 
are being executed, or when specifically required by the operat­
ing system.
Similarly, if feedback is not present, then the operat­
ing system does nob expect feedback error values from the ap ­
plication program.
V- . '
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Input Device Validation.
An input channel is defined in figure 24.
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FIGURE 24 - An Input Channel •
If a particular sensor is not replicated, 
to detect its failure by checking its 
reasonableness and consistency.
then it is possible 
input values for
If a sensor is duplicated, then a fault is easier to d e tect, 
and if a sensor is triplicated, then the faulty sensor is 
easy to identify. In a dual input system, once a fault has been 
detectud, the faulty sensor must be pin-pointed, or no useful 
data can be obtained about that plant variable. This iden­
tification is accomplished using the reasonableness and consis­
tency tests such as those applied to single censors.
It should be noted thut the reasonableness and consistency tests 
may fail if a sensor input value is reasonable even though it is 
incorrect. In such a case, it is Impossible to detect a single 
sensor failure or to identify the faulty sensor in a dual-sensor 
system.
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4,2.& W a t c h d o g ,Timing
When a processor executes an incorrect instruction, or uses 
incorrect data, three things may happen. Firstly, no incorrect 
results occur (this is an unlikely option). Secondly, incorrect 
results occur,- but the processor will exit the task as nor­
mal. Thirdly, the processor may enter an endless loop, or 
take an unpredictable direction of,execution.
To detect such faults, watchdog timing is used. For this purpose, 
each processor provides a -ask-complete signal whenever it has 
completed \the assigned ttisk. In the first- and second c a ses, 
the processor concludes its calculations, bu't at a time 
which is likely to be completely different to that of its 
counterparts. The time of occurrence of that processor’s 
task-ibmplete signal will therefore be significantly far front 
the signals of the other processors. In the third case, a 
task-complete signal may never be received from the faulty 
processor. An acceptable difference is,defined, within which 
time all processors must hove produced results, or an error 
is indicated.
The procedure is as shown in figure 25.
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Task IDProcessor Completion
write t&sk*c«!niplete record
check task*complete record
FIGURE 25 - Task Complete Records
After a task is complete, each operating system places a task- 
complete time in a t a s k - cowletlon table. Each operating system 
then compares the task-complett times to see if they are suffi­
ciently close. Otherwise, an error is indicated. Furthermore, the 
task-completion allows the extra check that the processors were 
executing the correct task.
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The primary use for the watchdog mechanism is to detect program 
flow errors, i.e. the situation where the program 
counter/instruction pointer has somehow obtained the incorrect 
instruction address. This usually leads to the processor never 
completing the current task, end also to its producing 
invalid data and becoming unusable. It could clearly never 
diagnose its own problems, so it is necessary for the other 
processors to take charge.
A secondary use for the mechanism is to detect errors that are 
missed by the other mechanisms due to the value of the error 
being acceptable to them. Such a situation can. arise when the 
processor mistakenly arrives at the correct answer after it 
has executed an incorrest instruction or used incorrect 
data. The overtime or undertime error exhibited by the task can 
then show that something is faulty.
Watchdog timing thus provides a means of detecting errors 
as Well as identifying the erring processor node.
4.2.6 Fault Handling
Faults are detected by the self testing facility as well as by 
the detection of an error by means of read-back of outputs, 
watchdog timing and voting. All error data are recorded in a data 
base which holds the historical fault manifestations and any 
other data that would help in the fault localization procedure.
Identification of the faulty node after tho detection of an er­
ror is, in most cases, provided by the detection mechanism. 
Where this fails, the operating system instructs the nodes 
to perform self- and mutual-testing to attempt to identify the 
faulty node or nodes. This forms port of the diagnostic sec­
tion of fault handling. Even where the fault has been localized 
by the error detection mechanisms, it is sometimes useful for 
further diagnostics to be performed so that system repairs can 
be made as soon as possible, and so that full records of failures 
are available for the system designer for design improvement. If
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fault identification fails, then the system as a whole has
failed, and must be restarted, after suitable repairs have 
been mode. '
Once a fault has been detected, it is necessary that all nodes be 
informed that an drtitir has occurred, which data is suspect, and 
w hich processor er pracessQrs may have caused the error. This 
data is also maintained in the error-reporting data base. This 
enables healthy processors to continue without relying on pos­
sibly erroneous data.
Since many of the errors are likely to be catised by transient 
faults, it id not advisable to shut down a processor as soon as 
it e r r s . Instead, the system temporarily ignores that processor, 
while the operating system restores its internal state to one 
that is consistent with that of the healthy processors. Once 
this has been accomplished, asid the processor brought back 
into loose skew synchronization, it may begin to execute ap­
plication tasks once more, and provide useful input to the
voters, A "black mark" is added to the record of the
processor, so that a frequently erring node can be recog­
nized, and shut down after 6n unacceptably high number of 
errors.
Once a processor has been taken out of the system, it is in­
structed to continue self testing to try and establish the 
cause of its errors. If the node continues to err this fact 
is recognized, and it remains out of the system. If, however, 
the node seems fault-free, then it may (in response to a 
status request) inform the system of its readiness to try 
again. The good processors aid the failed processor to recover 
by periodically resetting its state to one consistent with
the functional system. Then it can perform the same cal­
culations and see if they are correct. At no time is the 
node allowed to communicate spontaneously until it has been 
recognized as fit to do so. It may only communicate when 
specifically requested to do so by a running processor.
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4.3 Summary
The system provides a number of facilities for 
tolerance of-faults:
- Task I/O voting, in which both input and output to and 
memory, and input and output devices are compared before 
are used by the application
- Self and mutual testing, where nodes test themselves and 
other nodes in the system
- Time-staggered operation, which ensures that common- 
faults do not affect all processors in the same way
- Device operation validation, which ensures that devices 
operating correctly
- Watchdog timing, which keeps track of the execution of 
tasks, to ensure that there ore.no incorrect task executions
- Fault handling, to provide detection, identification 
isolation of faults
the
all
Following on from the functional description of the system, the 
next chapter describes the hardware and the software.
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5.1 Introduction
As was discussed previously, the composition of much of the ex­
perimental system was defined by the available equipment and 
tools. This meant that hardware development was kept to a mini­
mum, consisting essentially of integration of available commer­
cial equipment, and the construction of an input and output con­
sole for use with the servo system. The bulk of the design of the 
system therefore consisted of software development. The design 
process followed modern software engineering practices as far as 
possible, so that reliable software could be produced. The design 
sequence is covered section by section in this chapter, to il­
lustrate the logical progression of the design steps.
5.2 Hardware Characteristics 
The hardware consists of:
- Four Intel 80186-based single-board computers, used as the 
processing elements of the system, and for system monitoring
a Feedback MSlSO modular servo system, which served as the ap­
plication system for control, as part of a demonstration of the 
use of the computer system
- a Data Translation DT732 analog input and output card, used to 
interface the fault-tolerant structure to the servo system
an Intel 428 memory card for inter-node communication and sys­
tem operation records
- a 12-card Multibus rack to house the equipment
Two terminals were available for node monitoring, and a personal 
computer with an appropriate loading facility was available for 
downloading of software to the processor nodes.
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(For technical inf* 
appendix 5).
The software is
- Task 4 /0 handling
- Self and mill
- Time-staggered operatitn
- Watchdog timing
Irror handling
- Inter-node
- System initialization
6„3.1 Task I/O
I/O Device Ch<
To ensure that 
are faulty, it is 
devices are made, i when they be
For output 
channels must I 
data reasonabli
and f< itput
and ided.
:
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I/O Request Servicing.
In order for the application system to sake use of the 
fault-tolerance facilities, I/O request servicing must be 
provided. This will enable application modules to call operating 
system routines which perform input or output (as required) in a 
fault-tolerant manner.
To provide complete fault-tolerance facilities for the applica­
tion programs, all types 6f task I/O, including memory modifica­
tions (i.e. RAM output) and memory data ii>wut, as well as 
other peripheral I/O types must be catered for in the I/O 
request servicing routines.
I/O Records.
Throughout the operating system, records of operations must be 
maintained, for two main reasons;
to enable the operating system to perform fault diagnosis 
when necessary, and
- to allow system monitoring at various development phases and 
for maintenance and repair
In addition to the normal records, the I/O request servicing 
section of the system must maintain a list of the I/O 
devices together with their operational status and notes about 
peculiarities of the devices (such as replication of input 
devices and dual inputs to output devices).
5.3.2 Self and Mutual Testing
Both self testing and mutual testing must be included because 
of the possibility that the software in a node is corrupted. 
This corruption, when affecting the self-test software, 
may cause the node to erroneously report itself fault-free. The 
testing of a node by another node will detect this situation.
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Test Descriptions.
All parts of the system should be exercised by the test
programs, including the
- memory components
-  processor subsystem
- I/O equipment
- inter-node communication equipment 
and any other special equipment.
Teat Records. '
As before, ekror and fault records must be updated according 
to the results of the tests.
Alao, records must be  kept on the condition of devices,
including whether ot- not they are operational.
5.3.3 Tirae-starfgcred Operation
In order to overcome the effects of comrnon-mOde faults, time- 
staggered operation must be used,
5.3.4 Watchdog Timing
After each task, the node must make available to other nodes the
task number (identification) and completion time of tho last
tosk. This data will form the task-complete record for the task.
Thereafter, the node musk check the total task-complete record 
set (from all nodes) to see if there are any discrepancies. 
Both task numbers and task complete-times must be checked.
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I'he system must provide the facility to preserve system opera­
tion when an error has occurred. There should be the means to 
restore the system to its fault-free state wherever possible.
In order to facilitate fault isolation and to provide data for 
system repairs and improvement, it is necessary that the system 
perform fault diagnosis whenever it is suspected that a fault ex­
ists (namely when a node is isolated for testing).
6.3,6 Task Control
„tsk control is a most important part of the Operating system. 
Task control must take care of the scheduling and deschedul­
ing of tasks, both application tasks and operating, system tasks.
Routines oust be provided by which application tasks are able to 
schedule and dcschedule other application tasks.
A recoifd must be made on the execution of each task. This will 
aid system testing, maintenance, repair and improvement.
As was pointed out earlier, the inter-node communication carried 
oqt by modelling an actual system. Communication is imitated 
using common memory, but the format of the MIli-STD-1553B system 
protocol must be retained.
To be able to validate the communication system, it must pos­
sible to establish test links.
Although modelling of the bus is not part of the experimental 
system, it is necessary for demonstration purposes. Procedures 
must exist which will take care of flogs, and buffers, and 
perform other operations that would be handled by the com­
munication board.
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Bus activity should be recorded by the bus model procedures for 
the purposes of besting, maintenance and design improvement.
This suite of routines must be executed at power-up. The routines 
must establish the working environment for the operating system 
by initializing devices and performing system confidence tests.
(See appendix 7 for a more detailed 
ments of the software)
icription of the require-
5.4 Functional Specification of tho S o f twan
The functional specification of the software (see appendix 8) was 
derived directly froei the above software requirements.
A diagram of the software is shown in figure 26.
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FIGURE 26 - The Software System
5.4.1 Task Input and Qafcput 
I/O Device Checks.
I/O device checks consist of roodbock and feedback checking, 
reasonableness and consistency checking, oflid error signalling.
- Readback is applied to outputs to 
correct, while feedback che 
required effect is nccoi
nsura that their values are 
applied to ensure that the
to ensure that
consistency checking are applied to inputs 
values which they return arc within this ex-
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pected range, and are not changed, fjrora reading to reading, more 
than is possible for the device.
- Error signalling is accomplished in twoi parts. First, the
detection of an error results in anierror record being created, 
which alerts the operating system. Secondly, a status value 
is returned to the application program ooi that application-
dependent corrective action may be performed if required.
I/O Request Servicing.
I/O request servicing provides the means by which application
programs can utilize t h e ,fault-tolerance capabilities of the sys­
tem. The servicing consists of voting and grror signalling, and 
cun cater for all types of input and output, which can be per-r 
formed by the system. The characteristics of the input or output 
are held in a data base, enabling the servicing routines to 
provide the appropriate action for any type of I/O required.
I/O Records. ,
The chief I/O records which are maintained by the system ere 
the device characteristic records, which hold such information 
as reason bounds, maximum tolerable rates of change, and 
tolerance values.
In addition, error end fault records are maintained by the sys­
tem* This allows the operating system to maltlt decisions about 
the use of input and output channels.
5.4.2 Self and Mutual Testing
A broad functional partitioning of the system was undertaken, to 
identify the various sections to which testing could be applied. 
Testing is broken into the sections nf processor, memory, 
input and output equipment, and inter-node communication
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equipment. In., addition, there is the facility for invoking 
remote teats, and. for servicing such remote invocations.
- O f  ' ,)
T  H-bcessor testing is atVoiaplished by first testing critical in­
structions, and then using those instructions to check all other 
possible instructions.
ZLZ^S— ^ - ^ r i T i r ^ M s i s t  of setting parte “of iueraory to various 
values, and reading them back to See if they have changed. -
-r The form of the Input and output testing depends on the charac­
teristics of the input and output devices, an'ti special routines 
are needed for-each different type. J
_f-Inter-node ncomounication equipment tests eonsist o f  passing 
known j s^eissa^es across the l i n^s, b nd "checkinixth^t they are, as 
they should be. " t - it ^
A   ^ ^
- Remote tests are made up of combinations of the standard testa, 
bubs the results from them are evaluated by the processor that in- 
I't^&fes the- test, rather than the tm# being tested.
Test scheduling is accomplished dynamically. Tests^'laay be run 
whenever specifically required by tho application program, or.may 
be invoked by the operatingXystern. Invocation hy the operating 
system /fa*' be either in response to the occurrence of an error, 
or as a preventative raeastire^ whenever there is spare processing
j:. ■ f
TKk diagnosis of an error results in the creation of , an error 
record, and if it is determined that a fault exis t s , a fault 
record is created. Faulty devices arc marked as such.
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5.4.3 Tiae-staggered Operation
The clocks in each node are aet at initialization time to their 
staggered values. Periodic checks are made on the clocks to en­
sure that they do not drift unacceptably far apart. If excessive 
clock drift is detected, then the clocks are reset.
If the clock drift is auch that a clock fault is indicated, then 
an error record is generated.
5.4.4 Watchdog Timing
When each task has been completed, the operating system in the 
node provides the other nodes with the task identification, and 
task completion time. Before executing the next task, the operat­
ing system checks that the correct task has just finished, and 
that it finished within an acceptable time. Errors ere signalled 
when either of these testa shows a discrepancy.
5.4.5 Error Handling
Whenever an error is detected, the error handling mechanism is 
initiated. Consistency restoration, node reconfiguration end node 
resetting are provided by the mechanism, whenever such actions 
prove to be necessary.
Consistency restoration is accomplished in the voting process, 
when erroneous data is overruled by the votes of the correct 
processors. It is also accomplished for task errors, when the 
watchdog mechanism alerts the node to the incorrect execution of
When a node has detected the (predetermined) number of similar 
errors that Indicates that a fault is present, it performs fault 
pinpointing, to identify the fault. This is done using the infor­
mation held in the error records, together with additional test­
ing when necessary.
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Node reconfiguration is invoked when other nodes determine that e 
node has erred more frequently than is acceptable. This involves 
an instruction to the node to perform self-testing. Meanwhile, 
the rest of the system continues, ignoring that node until its 
usefulness has been proved.
At this time, the good nodes reset the previously erring node to 
a state which is consistent with the state of ufie rest of the 
system. This implies that the node must be made to execute the 
correct next task, with the correct data.
The creation of error and fault records is also part of the error 
handling nsechanism. Routines to accpayj^sh this creation are in­
voked by any routine that discovers !art elrror-
5.4.6 Task Control
Scheduling and descheduling of tasks is done via operating system 
"calls" that keep track of time usage. These routines can inter­
cept any overlapping that might be caused by erroneous applica­
tion program scheduling. The tasks to be executed are kept in a 
linked list, and are executed sequentially by  the operating sys-
Test and operating system tasks are handled in Just the same way 
as application tasks. An “ending" task, that runs after every 
other task, performs operating system maintenance on the 
scheduling list. The task removes the laat-ex6cuted task, and 
schedules tests if there is time. Then it initiates ths next
It should be noted that the scheduling scheme only permits a task 
to be executed if it can be run to completion in the available 
time. No task suspension is allowed, and task priority is not 
supported. This avoids tho problems involved with preserving the^ 
state of tasks when their execution is temporarily suspended.
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To aid diagnostics, a list of all tasks that have run, with their 
initiation and completion times, is maintained,
5.4.7 Inter-Node Communication
In order to ease the use of the communication system, and to 
allow error interception, routines are provided for inter-node 
transmission and retieption. These routines are expected 
to be used primarily when sensor inputs or control outputs are 
to be used, when the actual device is not attached to all 
nodes. •
For the exchange of data for voting, another routine is provided, 
that makes the communication system transparent to the user.
The status of the communication controller is intercepted by  the 
routines so that errors can be dealt with by the operating sys­
tem rather than the application program.
Modelling of the bus is provided by a program resident in the 
experimental system supervisor node.
5.4.8 System Initialization
The operating system ensures that the environment is cor­
rectly initialized before application tasks are allowed to 
be executed. This procedure takes the form of the initialization 
of all devices, followed by checks to ensure that the
initialization was successful.
Initialization of the environment is followed by extensive system 
testing to prove the usefulness of all the components of the
system. If critical components fail the tests, then a warning 
that the system can not be used, is given, and the system
Ay
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5.5 Software Outline
5.5.1 Introduction
The software consists of a set of routines which are used by 
both the operating system and the application programs. Each 
node has a copy of these routines (See appendix 9 for complete 
descriptions of the software),
In addition to routines used by both the operating system and 
the application, a suite of operating system subroutines is 
available. These consist mainly of test routines that allow 
system validation, and record maintenance facilities.
The other routines in the system are available to the applica­
tion programs, to allow task scheduling, task descheduling, 
inter-node •communication, input validation and output valida­
tion. Vsing these routines, error interception is possible,
5.5.2 Operating System Routines ,
Start up.
At start-up, the first operating system routine is started.
This routine initiates and tests the local node, then communi­
cates with the other nodes to set up the clock system. After the 
clock initialization has been checked, the routine
schedules the first application task, It is the respon­
sibility of this task to schedule all other application tasks.
Task ending.
At the end of every tas k , control is transferred to an end- 
off routine, which ensures that the last task was correctly ex­
ecuted on all nodes. It then ascertains the delay needed 
before the next application task is to run, and if there is
enough time, runs one or more of the test routines.
<?:■
it- -
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Test routines.
These test routines allow testing of the processor, memory, 
I/O facilities and inter-node communications equipment, of both 
the local node and any other node.
Whenever an error is detected, by either teat routines or voting, 
a routine to handle the error is invoked. This routine makes a 
record of the error, and calls a fault-handling routine if more 
errors than acceptable have occurred.
Fault handling.
The fault-handling routine ascertains the nature of the fault* by 
performing more tests if necessary, and records the existence of 
the fault. This allows the status of parts of the system to be 
known to the operating system at any time. Hence it will not 
utilize identified faulty components.
5.5.3 General tloutines
The rest of the routines are available to both th& operating sys­
tem, and the application programs. I '
Input and output.
The most important routines are those which allow validated 
output and input. These routines perform voting and checking 
of data. Input from, and output to memory is also supported by 
these routines.
When an input is required, the routine to validate input is 
called, and returns a validated piece of data, and a 
status value which informs the caller whether or not errors
have occurred. The routine makes use of other routines that test 
the validity of the data with respect to reasonableness and
consistency.
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Similarly,, the output routine performs the necessary output, and 
returns a status value. The routine makes use of routines that 
check feedback and readback signals if they are available.
Task handling.
A routine is provided for scheduling other tasks, or rescheduling 
the calling task. This routine checks that the request will cause 
no clashes. It then adds the task to the scheduling list.
Similarly, a routine is provided for removing a task from the 
scheduling list. This is useful for halting a repetitive task, 
and for clearing the scheduling list under error conditions.
Inter-node communications.
In order to simplify the use of the inter-node communica-1 
tion equipment, routines are provided for reception • and
transmission using the inter-node bus. Another routine is 
provided to perform mutual data exchange among all the nodes.
This is useful when equipment on the bus is not attached 
to one of the fault-tolerant nodes of th* system, and for ex­
change of data for voting.
6.6 Summary >
The hardware system consists of four single board com­
puters, a common memory board, and an analog input and output 
board, »11 housed in a single 12-card Multibus rack.
The software was required to provide fault-tolerance 
mechanisms for the system, of which the major functions are
- Task I/O handling
- Self and mutual testing of nodes
- Tine-staggered operation
- Watchdog timing
- Error handling
- Task control
- Inter-node coamuaitietion
-  System initialization
These requirements led to the functional specification of 
software system, which provided a definition of the necesi 
functions.
The programs of the system consist of two types: tl
able to both the operating system and the application 
and those available only to the operating s
general routines consist of modules that allow validat 
and output, task scheduling and descheduling,
node communication. The operating system routines 
test modules, and record maintenance modules.
Having covered the design of the system, the next 
describes the way in which all parts were integrated to ; 
the total system.
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6.1 Introduction
In order for the system to be used as an experimental tool, ex­
tensive control and monitoring of its behaviour had to be pos­
sible. These functions are provided by an extra processor, 
situated in the Multibus rack, together with the nodes of the 
fault-tolerant system. In addition to control and monitoring, 
this processor also provides simulation of the inter-node com­
munication system. In the remainder of the chapter, this node
will be referred to as the supervisor node.
6.2 Requirements for the Supervisor Node
The function of the supervisor node can be btoketi into two dis­
tinct sub-functions. These are
1} Handling of inter-node communication
2) Handling of system control and monitoring
6.2.1 Inter-node Oommunicotion
Several aspects of the communication system are controlled by the 
supervisor node. Firstly, the node has to service all the com­
munication system initialization commands from the n o d e s . This 
involves the detection of the commands from each node, and the 
provision of appropriate responses to the n o des.
Secondly, the supervisor node has to service every communication 
system command from the n o des. It is therefore necessary to 
detect the commands, road the system command block to find the 
command block list, and provide the actions required by the node. 
This process is described in detail in a following section.
In order to support the handling of communication system com­
mands, it is necessary to maintain a model of the communication 
system that provided an interface which is compatible with the 
intended communication protocol.
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The model of the cctmmunicati&'ti protocol is based on the external 
behaviour of an existing communication interface board. A reduced 
definition of this behaviour was derived and used as a specifica­
tion for the modelling program. The reduced definition is given 
in appendix 10.
In addition to maintaining the functions of the communication 
system, the supervisor node also keeps a record of all bus ac­
tivity, so that monitoring of the bus system is possible.
Monitoring of the system is provided by the supervisor node. This 
is facilitated by the maintenance of appropriate records in the 
common memory section tif the system. It was decided that suffi-1- 
clent visibility of the system could be  provided if it was pos­
sible to observe bus activity, task execution lists, and error 
and fault records.
In addition to the availability of -these data Structures for ex­
amination , it should be possible to observe any part of the com­
mon memory, so that system debugging and maintenance could be 
facilitated.
In order to control the environment of the system in such a way 
that it would be forced to use its fault-tolerance facilities, it 
should be possible to inject errors and faults into the system. 
This function la again provided by the supervisor node.
The terminal-handling section of the node, which allows the user 
to specify the desired supervisory actions, is menu driven, hence 
providing an easy means for system control and monitoring.
6.3 Description of the Supervisor Node
In accordance with the requirements for the supervisor, the node 
contains two main sections, namely a section for the handling of
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bus activity, and o section for the handling of terminal commands 
for system control and monitoring*
The attention of the supervisor node is divided between the two 
functions. While the supervisor is waiting for input from the 
terminal, it is also scanning the flags which indicate that bus 
modelling is required. The time taken for tlie servicing of a bus 
request is so short that a user does not notice any effect at the 
terminal.
6,3.1 Communication Handling
In order to describe the operation of the communicatioB handling 
section of the supervisor node, it is neceseefy .first to.give a 
description of the communication protocols and buffering systerv 
(Refer to appendix 10 for more details).
Format of the Communication.
All communication to and from the communication interface board 
is done through common memory. Within this memory, a number of 
structures exist. Using these structures, the node using the bus 
interface board can specify the actions it requires from the 
board. It can also obtain information about bus activity or the 
status of the bus interface board, ,
The first structure is known as the System Command Block, or SCB. 
This command block allows the node to control the operation of 
the communication interface board in o brood sense; the commends 
allow resetting of the board, reading of its status, causing.it 
to begin execution of a soquonco of commands, and causing it to 
suspend this execution or stop it altogether.
In addition, the SCB points to the locations of the other struc­
tures used in the control of the communication interface board.
The Command Block List, or CBL, is a structure which contains the 
detailed instructions for the bus interface board. These take
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the form of Commend Blocks (CBs), each of which describes an ac­
tion whifrh the interface board is to take, and provides memory 
location^ for responses from the board.
The f " - ' ^central structure is tha Bus Bviint Queue (BEQ), which 
hoi'1 / • qt Descriptor Blocks (BBDBs). Bach BEDB contains 
del {A bus event that apptias to the node which the com­
munis. ■ <erfnce board is serving. i
The interface board can be in one. of three states: bus control­
ler, remote tet-m^nal, or bus monitor. There is only one bus con­
troller, and it is the only node that can initiate bus activity. 
It is possible for bus controllership to fee transferred between 
nodes, provided that the interface board attached to the node is 
capable of controlling the bus.
Remote terminals use the bus, but only when instructed to do so 
by the bus controller. Bus monitors never use the bus; they can 
only monitor1 its activity.
Since all bus activity is initiated by the bus controller, there 
ia no need for there to be a BEQ in the bus controller memory 
structure. Therefore, BEQs apply only to remote terminals.
In addition to this restriction, some action commands apply only 
to bus controllers, while Others apply only to remote terminals.
Communication Handling >
The model for cach communication interface consists of receive 
and transmit buffers, plus intermediate receive and transmit 
buffers which are situated in common memory. It is via these in­
termediate buffers that messages are passed to and from the su­
pervisor node, because both the fault-tolerant node and the su­
pervisor node have access to this memory, but not the local node
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In addition to these buffers, the supervisor node maintains 
records of the status of the interface board.
At initialization, the supervisor node -provides* the correct 
responses to commands from the nodes, even though it does not 
need the initialization information which they send it1.
During - normal operation, the supervisor node waits until.a flag 
is set in common memory, which indicates that a ' node requires 
Servicing. It then determines which node "requires the servicing,, 
and resets the appropriate flag. -
The processing sequence continues with the supervisor reading the 
tiystem Command Block, if the command block does not require the 
execution of a Command Block List, tiven the supervisor node 
simply executes the command required by thSOgysteiq Command i&jlock» 
and then terminates. 'v.
Tf "execution of a CBL is required, then t h ^  supervisor node ob­
tains the first Command Block from t h e l l s t  and services it ap­
propriately. Processing of the CBl continues until a CB contains 
an instruction to suspend execution1 of the or one which in­
dicates that the end of the list has-been reached.
The action commands which are supported by the communication'han­
dling software are:
NOP - No action is taken, but this command is useful when 
manipulating CBLs.
CONFIGURE - Allows each node to configure its communication- in­
terface as a bus controller or as a remote terminal. The com­
munication handling software ensures that only th first node 
which attempts to configure as a Bus Controller (BC) is success-
BUS CONTROL ACCEPTANCE ENABLE - Used only by Remote -Terminal 
Units (RTUs), this command is used to inform the bus interface
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whether or not the node is prepared to accept the responsibility 
of controlling the bus system.
BUS tiONTROL ACCEPTANCE DISABXE - Used to disallow acceptance of 
bus.control. v n
SKT SUBSYSTEM ERROR - Sets the subsystem efror bit in the status 
word for the node. ^
CtBAR'SUBSYSTEM ERROR - Resets the subsystem error vb'it in the 
stebus word for the node.
WRITE TO TX BUFFER - Copies data from the node into the transmit 
buffer in the interface memory,
READ FROM RX BUFFER - Copies data from the interface memory to 
the node. .
TRANSMIT TO RTU - Used by the bus controller, this command causes 
an RTU to receive from the bus, and to place the received data 
into its receive buffer. This command can also be used to offer 
bus controllership to the RTU, or request it to send its current 
status to the controller.
RECEIVE FROM TiTU - Used by the bus controller., this command 
causes an RTU to transmit the contents of its transmit buffer 
over the bus.
TRANSFER FROM RTU TO RTU - Used by the bus controller* this com­
mand causes one RTU to transmit the contents of its transmit 
buffer over the bus, end causes another RTU to receive that data.
6.3.2 System Monitoring and Control
By means of a menu-driven program, the user can specify errors 
and faults which he wishes to introduce into the system. Also,
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tion records to be displayed. It is also possible to examine any 
part of the common memory, in bytes.
In order to introduce faults and errors into the system, a set of 
flags is maintained in the common memory area. At the request of 
the jiser, these flags are set or reset.
In the fault-tolerance software of the system nodes, these flags 
are examined at appropriate tiroes, and system behaviour is 
modified according to bheir settings.
If an error flag is found to be set, then the program introduces 
an error into the test which should detect that error. There­
after, it clears the error flag. Similarly, if a fault flag is 
found to be set, then the error is introduced, but the flag is 
not reset by the system software. Hence, the setting of errors 
causes only one erroneous operation, while the setting of a fault 
causes erroneous operations to continue until the user chooses to 
reset the fault flag.
The system can set any d£ the faults and errors shown in tables 1
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80186 CPU fault 
80130 fault 
8259 PIC fault 
8274 MPSC fault 
8255 PPI fault
Inter-node communication fault 
Node operation fault
Memory fault (including the exact memory area which
80186 initialization error
80130 initialization error
8259 initialisation error
8274 initialization., error
Communications initialisation error
Core instruction error
Instruction error
Memory error a
80130 interrupt error
80130 timer error
8259 PIC error
6274 MPSC error
8255 PPI error
Node isolation error
Node resetting error
Clock setting error
Scheduling error
Descheduling error
Data error
Remote test voting error 
Remote test activation error 
Task completion task error 
Task completion time error 
Next task voting error
TABLE 1 - Node Errors and Faults
is faulty)
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CommuniCBtlon link fault, for 
Input fault, for inputs 0, 1, 
Output fault, for outputs 0,
links 0->l, 0~>2 . 
>r 1
Communication link error, for links 0 ->1, 
Input- consistency error, for inputs 0, 1, 
Input reason error, for inputs 0, 1, 2, o 
Output readback error, for outputs 0, or 
Output feedback e r ror, for outputs 0, or
TABLE 2 - General System Errors and Faults
The display which is invoked to show the error records indicates 
the number of times each error has been detected, as foe),'1 as the 
node in which it occurred, and the node(s) whiyh detected' the er-
The fault display shows only whether a fault is present" or not, 
because they are regarded as permanent. It also shows the node in 
which the fault was found, and the node(s) which f&und it.
Bus activity is indicated by time, initiating node, action com­
mand, source node (if relevant) and- destination node (if 
relevant).
The execution of tasks is recorded 
task identification number.
sing start ti. end time
6.4 System Testing
System testing was achieved by implementing a simple servo- 
control system using the fault-tolerant equipment. Three applica­
tion tasks were introduced into the software. The first of these 
application tasks served to initialize the hardware required to
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perform control of the . servo system. In addition, this task 
scheduled the other two tasks.
The second task utilizes the analog input equipment to read a 
position request value from a potentiometer associated with the 
control system. The task is run periodically, so that changes in 
request Value can be reflected in the position of the servo 
device.
The final application task performs actual control of the servo 
device. The request value is obtained from memory, and parameters 
of the servo device are measured via the analog input equipment. 
Elementary calculations are made using this information, and a 
signal, for application to the servo system, is derived. ThAs 
value is sent to the servo via the analog output facility. 
Validation is applied to this output. This control task is also 
run periodically, but at a faster rate than the request value
6.5 Summary
The supervisor node provides two functions; namely the servicing 
of communication system requests, and handling of user requests 
from the terminal.
The communication system is imitated in such a way as to provide 
the sase command format as would be present if the actual com­
munication interface boards were used.
The supervisor node allows the user to specify errors and faults 
for injection into the system. Also, error, fault, bus activity 
and task execution records can be displayed. Common memory can be 
examined.
System testing was accomplished in a simple servo-eontrul en­
vironment .
Chapter 6 SYSTEM INTEGRATION
This concludes the description of the experimental system. The 
following chapter suiainarizes the work, and discusses several 
issue's which arose in the development of the experimental system.,
Chapter 7 - CONCiUSIOH
7.1 Summary
7.1.1 Fault Tolerance
It was pointed out earlier that fault tolerance i# a technique 
w hich attempts to allow a computer system to operate correctly in 
the presence of faults. Su6h an approach has become necessary b e ­
cause of the serious effects which the failure of scute computer 
systems could cause. Those computer failures cati have, their 
origins as far back a6 the system specification phase of system 
development, or the cause can be as immediate as electromagnetic 
interference. Specification faults will be propagated through the 
system design, until they manifest themselves in a way which 
ceuses the computer to behave incorrectly.' Implementation faults 
and component faults are also a problem, while external distur­
bances can clearly lead to system failure.
Fault tolerance involves the detection of errors, identification 
of the fault which caused the error, confinement of the damage 
causiid by the fault, system recovery, and finally, system repair.
In order to accomplish those effects, replication of system 
resources is a key principle. This replication m a y  take the form 
of ilifortfsfciaB redundancy* hardware redundancy, . software redun­
dancy and/or time redundancy,
7.1.2 Software Development Techniques
One of the major premises adopted when designing fault-tolerant 
systems is that the software is fault-free. Hence, it is essen­
tial that extreme care is taken in the design of the software 
section of the system. The use of modern software development 
techniques improves the quality of the software which is 
produced. As haa been pointed out, the steps which are generally 
applied when attempting to put good software design into practice
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- complete and accurate specification of the required software
- decomposition of the specification into manageable steps
- construction of the software
- proof of software correctness
A number of tools and techniques are used to aid this process, 
many of which have been used in the present w ork,
7,1.3 System Description '
The objective of the design described in this dissertation /iwas^to 
produce a flexible experimental system which could be S sed to 
study various fault-tolerance techniques. Because of limited 
hardware possibilities, as well as for flexibility, software 
implemented fault-tolerance was chosen as the implementation 
method, together with replication of processor boards.
The system produced provides a number of facilities for the 
tolerance of faults, including:
- task input and output voting
- self and mutual testing of the processor boards
- time-staggered operation for the avoidance of common-mode fault 
problems
- device operation validation, for input and output devices
- watchdog timing, in the form of task completion checks
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7.1.4 System Design
The composition of much of the system was defined by •available 
equipment and tools, and the hardware consists of several single- 
board computers, a common memory board, and an analog input and 
output board, all housed in a Multibus-compatible rack.
The program modules in the system consist of two types; those 
available to both the operating system, as well as to the ap­
plication tasks, and those whieh are available oaly to the 
operating system. The general routines consist of modules that 
allow validation of input and output, task scheduling and des­
cheduling, and inter-node communication. The operating system 
routines consist essentially of test modules and record main­
tenance modules. '
7.1.5 System Integration
In order for the system to be used as an experimental tool, ex­
tensive control and monitoring had to be possible. These func­
tions are provided by an extra processor, which also provided 
handling of inter-node communication. This, in turn, required the 
modelling of the intended communication protocols.
System testing was done by providing o small application program 
which controlled a modular servo system.
7.2 Discussion
It was thought that an examination of the techniq^js of fault- 
tolerance would reveal n dominant technique which could be used 
as a basis for the design. Such was not the case, however; it be­
came clear that almost all the different ways to achieve fault- 
tolerance functions had found use in commercial systems.
7.2.1
: V y :
"I /.I,
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Furthermore, this variance was not constrained to the different 
application areas; in the field of transaction processing, for 
instance, multiple replication (the Tandem system) [12], pair- 
and^a-spate (the Stfatus system) [25] and hob back-up (the 
Resilient system) [12] are all used.
Clearly, then, a very flexible design had to be used for the ex­
perimental system.' Also, a single configuration had to be chosen 
for implementationton the system. Although triple modular redun­
dancy was chosen, any of the other techniques could clearly be 
just aa effective f^r some applications.
The; field of software engineering is so vast and new that only a 
few of the more important techniques could be applied. In addi­
tion, the fact that the programming "team" consisted of one per*- 
son proved to be somewhat limiting, in that the benefit of an un­
biased opinion was lacking. ,| -
The principle of structured top-down design appeared to be  most
applicable to the type of system which was to be constructed. 
Data flow techniques appeared to be most easily applicable to 
transaction processing systems, so they were not used in the 
design process.
Following the chosen structured design procedure proved to be
useful: the system development steps could be seen to follow 
properly from one another. This allowed good consistency to be
maintained in tho design. The system functional specification, 
discussed in chaptcr 4, led to the software requirement 
specification (Appendix 7), which led to the software functional 
specification (Appendix 8), and then to the software description 
(Appendix 9).
At all stages, it was possible to apply verification by com­
parison with the previous stage. ,
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7.2.3 Evaluation of the Experimental System
In order to allow flexible, use of the experimental system, a 
large number of different fault tolerance facilities have been 
provided, which can be incorporated as the user desires.
It is also possible to produce different configurations by making 
small changes to the relevant software. During system testing, 
much was done using the du^l system configuration, even though 
the software was based on the triple modular redundant structure. 
This supports the claim that the software is easily modifiable.
A number of relevant issues arose during construction and testing 
of tho system. These are^ disctlssed briefly in the following
paragraphs.
System features.
I/O Record Adaptability. The application programs in the system 
know the input and output channels of the system only by t&e
identifier of the variable holding the relevant value. The I/p 
record structure holds all equipment-dependent information which 
is necessary to perform the I/o'Uunction. Hence, it is possible 
to allocate any input or output to any appropriate input or out­
put equipment in the system, simply by setting the I/O records
accordingly.
Input Consistency. Since a major error-detection mechanism in the 
system is the application of voting, it is essential that input 
to all the nodes is consistent. If such is not the case, then two 
error-detection opportunities are lost! firstly, voting on inputs 
can not be used, and secondly,, voting on any results which are 
based on the inputs is useless, becausn the results cannot be 
guaranteed to be the same.
The - .fore, it is highly recommended that all application programs 
make use of the input and output validation procedures provided
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System Limitations.
Control Algorithm Selection. It should be noted that the control 
system implemented usingithe experimental fault-tolerant computer 
is very simple. It was not the purposes the project to produce 
an optimized control algorithm, but rather to show that the ideas 
could tje used in the control of real systems. The complexity and 
sophistication of the application system isj left,to the applica­
tion programmer.
Task flashing Errors. The system was designed to report an error 
when a  ftcheduling call would cause a clash with a previously 
scheduled task, gt has been 'ftiuiid that it may be useful to allow 
clashes to be reported simply by returning a status value to the 
task attempting to perform scheduling. In this way, the tesit^ctfh 
continue in its endeavour to perform scheduling with a different 
schedule - time so as to avoid the c l ash. Alternatively, the ap­
plication may wish to perform some other action. %
Therefore, clashes are n o t .errors as such, and should not be 
reported to the error handling system.
Synchronization.
Synchronization proved to be troublesome. This was mainly due to 
inaccurate specification of individual task execution times. This 
led to task execution over-runs in some cases'. Since the node 
which controls the bus has to execute different instructions for 
every bus access than do the remote terminal nodes, these over­
runs led to loss of synchronization. 1
A second scheduling problem was that relative scheduling was ini­
tially used (i.e. tasks were scheduled to run at the "present 
time" plus a predetermined offset). Again because the bus con­
troller executes different instructions when the bus is used, 
this type of scheduling led to synchronization loss.
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To combat these problems, two solutions were used. Firstly, the 
proper execution times were ascertained by observing the task ex­
ecution records usini; the supervisor node. A safety factor was 
added to these values, and the task records werd updated to 
reflect the net# execution times.
It is expected that this will be the best way of determining the 
execution times of any application program installed on the sys-
Secondly, absolute scheduling was used. The schedule time for a 
repetitive task is calculated by  referring to the number of times 
the task has already executed. This may lead to problems in a 
multi-application sys'eem where repetitive tasks are added and 
removed in an unpredictable way. Another aethod Would have to be 
devised for such a. case. However, the project was not intended to 
produce scheduling techniques for complex applications, but 
rather to provide the facility for scheduling and descheduling in 
any user-chosen manneSr*
7.3 Conclusion > .
Considerable study into the subject of fault-tolerance was under­
taken, allowiii>. uaiiiarity with the principles, terminology, 
tools and techniques to be gained. In addition, the experimental 
system produced formed a useful tool, allowing many of  the tech­
niques to be tried out in an actual control environment.
Because of the extensive control and monitoring provided by the 
system, and also because of the simple control algorithm used, 
device control performance is somewhat slow, This means that the 
system itself could not be used in any but the most trivial con­
trol applications. However, the ideas behind the system, ,and also 
some of the software modules, could find use in real control sys-
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A REVIEW OF CURRENT FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEMS APPENDIX 1
Al.1 Introduction
Numerous computer systems which utilize fault-tolerance tech­
niques ace commercially available. This is especially true in the 
fields of on-line transaction processing (OLTP) and control of 
machinery. Table Al-l shows a number of commercial fault-tolerant 
systems. i'^
Some of these systems stand out as being particularly important. 
They demonstrate the extensive use of fault-tolerance techniques 
in computers which perform functions that are critical in terms 
of safety or data integrity.
Among the most significant fault-tolerant computer systems, which 
will be reviewed in the following sections, are;
Control systems; ‘ ^
- The Software-Implemented fault-Tolerance (SIFT) systejg
- The Fault-Tolerant Multi-Processor (FTMP) system
- The Triplex 32 system
- The Agusta 129 system 
A signal processing system:
- The Fault-tolerant Array Signal Processor (FASF)
Transaction processing systems:
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General purpose systems:
- The Intel 432 system -
- The Basic Fault-tolerant System (BFS)
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SYSTEM PURPOSE PRIMARY FAULT-TOLERANCE 
MECHANISM
System 4000 OLTP Replication
Self-checking
"I'm alive" messages
Power 55/5 OLTP Replication
Timeouts
Parallel 300 OLTP Rot back-up "i
Sequoia Systems Replication
Self-checking
Stratus Computers o i .T r Pair-and-a-spare
Self-checking
Synapse N+l o w r Replication
Timeouts
Tandem Nonstop o w r Replication
"I’m alive" messages
Eternity Replication
" I ’m alive" messages
Timeouts
Resilient Duplication
"I ’m alive" messages
C a n ’t Fail 300 Process control
TABLE Al-1 - Fault-tolerant Systems [25]
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SYSTEM PURPOSE PRIMARY FAULT-TOLERANCE 
MECHANISM
DAC-6000 Process control Hot back-up 
Timeouts
Cross diagnostics
Sys ternsafe/1000 Process control Hot back-up 
Timeouts
. . . . Process control Replication
Timeouts
Triplex 32 Process control TMR
s m Aircraft control Replication
rIBP Aircraft control Hybrid TMR
Agusta 129 Aircraft control Hot back-up
Self-testing
Timeouts
Cross diagnostics
SPACE SHUTTLE Flight control Triple or quad 
redundancy
TABLE Al-1 (confc.) - Fault-tolerant Systems
A REVIEW OF CURRENT FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEMS APPENDIX 1
SYSTEM PURPOSE PRIMARY FAULT-TOLERANCE 
m e c h ’a n i s m
JPE-Star General TMR with spares 
Voting
Intel 432 General Fair-and-a-spare 
Functional redundancy
BFS General Replication 
Self-testing 
Cross diagnostics
Bell ESS Telephone
Switching.
T  oa;\^up or voting 
.b f-c? firing or 
croi. ^agnostics
'  '
Signal processing Replication,
Timeouts
t:
TABLE Al-1 (cont.) - Fault-tolerant Systems
Al .2 Control Systems
Al.2.1 The SIFT System f l Q i r 2 6 ) f 2 7 ?
The SIFT system is intended for use in aircraft control. In 
development of the system, failure modes {the different ways in 
which system components can fail) were not considered. Rather, 
only the distinction between failed and non-falled equipment was 
made. Low-level techniques for fault-tolerance, such as ei- 
ror detection and correction codes are not included" in the 
design, since they offer little improvement. 1
1
122
A REVIEW OF CURRENT FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEMS APPENDIX 1
The SIFT Concept of EauLt-Tolerance,
System Overview. Reliability is achieved by having each itera­
tion of a task independently executed by a number of processing 
modules. Each processor places the outputs of each iteration 
into memory allocated to that processor. A processor requiring 
this output determines the value to be used by reading the out­
put .generated by each processor which executed the itera­
tion. Typically, a two-out-of-three vote is used, and errors are 
recorded for use by the executive system when determining which 
unit is faulty. Voting is minimized by considering data
only at the beginning of each iteration. This means that 
processors may run in loose synchronization (such as to
within 50 us of one another), allowing execution at slightly dif­
ferent times. The number of units which execute a task can vary. 
This is determined dynamically by the global executive task, 
which reconfigures the arrangement of the system when necessary.
Fault Isolation. Propagation of erroneous data is
prevented by allowing each processor to write only to its own 
memory.
Fault Masking. Masking is achieved when necqssary by 
majority voting between a suitable number-; of copies of any
required data.
Scheduling. Two timing requirements are generally specified for 
control outputs;
output to control actuators must be generated with a
specific frequency
the delay between the reccing of sensors and the 
generation of outputs must not exceed a specified value
SIFT scheduling is a slight variant of a simple periodic method.
Tasks are run at multiples of a base frequency, with the
priority of a task determining its iteration rate.
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Processor Synchronization. Even though processor synchronization 
is loose, clock drift or failure will result in the loss of 
this synchronization. To facilitate resynchronization, use is
made of an algorithm which allows up to one third of the clocks 
to fail .while still maintaining synchronization, The algorithm is 
as follows: each clock reads the values of all other clocks, 
as well as those clock's interpretations of the other clocks. 
If all, readings for a particular clock do not agree, then it 
is ignored. The median of all valid clocks is found end used as 
the resynchronization value.
Reliability Prediction. The design goal was to attain a failure 
rate of less then IQ-9 failures per hour for ten hours. Markov 
modelling was used to predict the reliability of the system, 
making the following assumptions;
- faults are uncorrelated, and distributed exponentially
- faults are permanent (transient faults are* masked)
- the failure rate of the main processor modules is 10~4 
per hour
- the failure rate of I/O processor modules and busses is 
10-s per hour
The reliability which was predicted from the calculations was ac­
ceptably high for the intended application.
A REVIEW OF CURRENT FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEMS 
!The SIFT R a N w a r e .  (See tiff. Al-1)
APPENDIX 1
INPUT W O  OUTPUT 
PROCESSOR MODULES CPU MEN.
PROCESSOR
FIGURE Al-1 - The SIFT Hardware (28)
Standard units were used wherever possible. Processor-to-bus in­
terfaces, bus-Vo-mamory interfaces, and the busses were specially 
designed, however.
Interconnection system operation. Each bus controller con­
tinuously scans the processors to see if a bus operation is 
required. Similarly, each memory scans the busses to see if it is 
needed. Bus delays are insignificant, because of the small amount 
of datu transfer that is required.
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The SIFT Software.
The Application Software. Application software performs the ac­
tual flight control computations by means of iterative 
t asks, Input to, and output from the tasks is handled by the 
executive system. . '
The Executive Software. The executive system has several 
functions:
- It runs each task at its required rate
- It. provides error-masked inputs
- It detects errors, •vnd- '^gnoses their cause
It reconfigures the system to avoid the use of failed 
components
Bach processor runs a local reconfiguration task and an error- 
reporting task. Error reports are made to the global executive 
task, Which decides on the necessary action, and places the ap­
propriate command in a buffer. Local reconfiguration tasks 
read the buffer, and perform the required action. ;
Local executive tasks run each application task allocated to the 
processor, provide inputs to them, receive outputs from them, and 
report errors, Local executive tasks can be invoked by a running 
task, a clock interrupt, or a call from another local executive. 
Local executive tasks provide the following functions:
- error handling
- scheduling
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- buffering i~-
- voting
Fault Detection. An analysis of errors which havs occurred can 
indicate which units are faulty. Bach processor maintains a 
processor/bus error table, in the’form of an m x n m a trix, where 
m is th# number of processors, and n is the number of busses. 
Each entry Xe (i,j) is the number of errors involving either 
processor i or bus j , as detected by processor p. The entries ate 
compared with maximum tolerable numbers of errors, beyond which, 
faults are indicated. If the global executive is uncertain of the 
location of a fault, it can schedule diagnostic tasks.
Proof of Correctness. i
Software correctness had to be proved mathematically, ^.be­
cause of the vast number of combinations of possible states 
of the system. Because of the complexity of the system a si a 
w h ole, models were used, ■ ■ 'j
Al.2.2 The FTMP. System T291 \ .
The FTMP system is intended for use in aircraft control. Proces­
sor modules, with local cache metooby, and memory modules, hre 
connected by a redundant serial bus. Modules are associated ihto 
groups of three. Every module contains a voting element, and spe­
cial hardware to prevent tho propagation of faults from one 
module to another.
Rationale of tho FTMP approach.
A failure rate of less than 10's failures per hour on a ten hour 
flight was required. Fault masking was to bo used, and all system 
resources had to be verifiable during system operation.
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A TMR-hybrid architecture is used, with graceful degradation. 
Operation is synchronous, allowing bit-by-bit hardware voting 
on all transactions. Modu7,es can be reconfigured as necessary.
Theory of the FTMP.
Noainal Organi 
p; ograias, while 
cache memory, are 
on the amount
ommon , memory holds high-level 
ve set of procedures, resident in 
d to interpret the programs. This cuts down 
information that must be transferred when
programs are loaded into a processor. The less 
tion held in a processor's cache memory, th 
perform reconfiguration.
unique informa—
Available processors examine ti job queue, 
they have the resources to run. Henc 
dynamic, and adjusts itself to^ mom' 
tion and to module failures.
be granted’ 
priority.r
Tne FTMP uses
and select jobs which 
, job allocation is 
ntary load distribu-
a first-come first-
Redundant .Organize 
times the required nominal number of module; 
modules are grouped into flexible triads 
available busses also form a triad. Bach meml 
uses a different bus for communication.,
and three of the 
of a module triad
guardian units govern the status of a module, 
bus triad selection,
. configuration selection (See fig. Al-2).
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BG BIG,
MODULE
BU SES
FIGURE Al-2 - An FTMP Module [29]
Both bus guardians must agree before ; power-on or bus trans­
mission is permitted. Power, bual inputs and timing are 
separate for each bus guardian1; and euch is physically separate 
from other guardians and modules. Bus; guardians are addres­
sable as part of memory. Messages sent to bus guardians are 
commands which the bus guardians apply to their outputs un­
til the command is superseded. The bus guardians are thus used 
as agents to convey the computer configuration authority to all 
elements of the computer.
The bus isolation gates are isolated from < 
control lines are independent.
another and their
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Processor end memory failures are handled as shown in figure Al-
3-
PROCESSOR FAILS ROM FAILS
4/ I NO RAM ^
' TRIAD COMPLETES Rflfl .
JOB STEP 1 s4- ' - COPY OF VOTED
IDENTIFICATION OF , DATA MADE OPERATION
ERRONEOUS MODULE INTO RAM
4 nU 2ND FAULT
RECONFIGURATION ROf;
BY MEANS OF BUS REMOVED /
GUARDIANS FAILURE OF
MEMORY
FIGURE Al-3 - Processor end Memory Failure Handling [29]
Synchronization. Synchronization is tight, allowing hardware 
voting, and easy programming. To achieve the required
synchronization, the timing references are continuous . and': ac­
curate. There are four clocks and clock lines, three of which 
are chosen by each processor for voting (See fig. A l -4).
3
k REVIEW OF CURRENT FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEMS APPENDIX 1
A REVIEW OF CURRENT FAULT-TOLERANT SYSTEMS
SEQUENCE
^ P H Y S I C A L  M A L F U N C T I O N
L OGIC M A L F U N C T I O N
i
> D A T A  M A L F U N C T I O N
4" •
S U B S Y S T E M  M A L F U N C T I O N  
SYSTEM M A L F U N C T I O N
FIGURE Al-5 - The Malfunction Train [29]
Masking of errors holds malfunctions at a low level.
When a malfunctioning unit is identified, it is configured out of 
the system,- and full fault-tolerance is restored. Reconfiguration 
may fail because of exhaustion of spares, malfunction of the 
reconfiguration mechanism, or the use of defective spares.
The FTMP reconfiguration mechanism is 
and bus guardian units. Failure of 
single module can cause it to transmit 
leading to errors.
largely within the voters 
all guardian units in a 
on more than one bus,
Fault detection is accomplished when a disagreement occurs at a 
voter. Fault identification involves the discovery of the 
module, bus, or other element which failed. Redistribu-
tio of resources may be aid this discovery.
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Re=p3Qverir is made by reassifinoent and reinitialization of modules. 
Program rollback is a secondary recovery process.
Survival and Dispatch Probability Models for the FTMP.
In order to evalu.i6.te the reliability of the FTMP system, the 
survival probability (the probability that the system will func­
tion correctly for the full duration of its use), and the dis­
patch probability (the probability that the system is put
into use with sufficient resources to survive during its use) 
were calculated. ,
Survival Probability Models. Failures may arise from one of three 
sources:
- lack of perfect coverage Markov modelling was used to 
predict the failure rate due to lack of perfect coverage. It was 
assumed that there were no lafceftt faults at takeoff, that recon­
figuration returns the system to" a perfect state, that all failed
busses are active, and that all undetected triple faults cause
system failure. It was shown that the probability of failure due 
to imperfect coverage was dominant in the first 50 hours of sys­
tem use. Most double failures could be tolerated, but some led to 
system failure. To achieve a system failure rate below 10-* per 
hour for ten hours, the probability of latent faults at takeoff 
had to be below 10-6 per hour.
- exhaustion of spares - the minimum number of units which 
are necessary for the acceptable operation of the system, deter­
mines the point at which exhaustion of spares becomes
significant. It was found that spare exhaustion became sig­
nificant after 50 hours.
Bus guardian unit transoission-enable mode failure - both 
BGUs would have to fail before the module could transmit
incorrectly. It was found that the BGU failure rate was in­
significant.
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Dispatch
minimum
takeoff
ability
takeoff.
Reliability. The "dispatch minimum compliment" is the 
number of operational resources required at
for sufficient system reliability. This number depends 
mis'aioA requirements. Dispatch reliability is the prob- 
that this minimum compliment will be available at
Al.2.3 . Triplex 32 [4]
The Triplex 32 is a triple-modular redundant programmable con­
troller, using Motorola 68000 microprocessors as processing ele­
ments. The controller contains three identical modules, each with 
its own CPU, memory, voting units and power supply. Each module 
monitors the operation of the others by  means of a triplicated 
bus (See fig. Al-6). The.modules are synchronized, and execute 
identical programs. If one module disagrees with the others, it 
is marked, and ignored.
OUTPUT i
FIGURE Al-6 - The Triplex 32 Struct,
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Faults are masked, and modular design permits quick re­
placement of faulty modules.
Faulty modules may be replaced without removing power. The re­
placement module is brought into synchronization by bac k ­
ground software running on. the other two modules, without 
interfering with the execution of the applications.
Al.2.4 Agusta 129 [30]
The Agusta 129 is a multiprocessor system which implements 
automated helicopter flight control, stability augmentation and
navigation as well as many other functions. The system is dual
redundant and is based on a MIL-STD-1553B bus (See fig. Al-7).
REMOTE 
UNIT t-
OTHER
1553
INTERFACE!
EQUIPMENT
LOCAL 
tiMT 'I REMOTE UNIT 2
FIGURE Al-7 - The Agusta 129 Structure [30]
Each master unit has the architecture shown in fig. Al-8. Only 
one of the two units is active at any time, while the other per-
v 6 ':
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forms the same computations, and serves as a hot back-up. Bach 
unit performs as much self-checking as time allows.
1553 BUS
PORI
INTERFACEMEMORY
PROCESSOR
PROCESSOR
FIGURE Al-8 - The Agusta 129 Master Unit [30]
Fault-tolerance in this system depends largely on software im­
plementation. The last resort check is cross-channel comparison 
between master units. If disagreement occurs, then the entire 
system is forced into a passive state. To limit the effect of 
mis-comparisons, mors than one disagreement must occur before 
shut-down is allowed.
All3 The Fault-tolorant Arrnv Sirtnnl Processor [9]
This system wai 
signal processing, 
reliability.
developed 
As such,
ovide space-based digital 
system required high
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Al.3.1 Design Principles
In the FASF system, hardware resources are partitioned into 
processing modules which are interconnected to form a .dis­
tributed system. Software is also partitioned, into tasks that 
run in a concurrent operating environment. Processing modules 
and tasks are under the control of a partitioned operating 
system. This partitioning is necessary because of the danger of 
failure in a central control system.
Al.3.2 System Architecture .
The FASP comprises a number of identical hardware modules 
working together. The interconnection structure consists of a 
two-dimensional square matrix of busses.
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FIGURE Al-9 - FASP System Operation [9]
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System operation consists of the following levels (See fig. Al-
9);
- the physical level - this includes direct memory access, and 
control of shared resources 5
- the dato link level - in which a cyclic redundancy check is 
used to provide correction of data
tlio network level - this provides system-wide 
communication between processing modules
- the task level - tasks communicate via mailboxes '
- the applications level - several tasks interact to 
provide the necessary processing for a specific ap­
plication
Faults at one level are usually corrected without involving 
other levels.
Al.4 Transaction P r o c o B a i T i g  Systems 
Al.4.1 The Tondem System (12]
The Tandem multiprocessor architecture eliminates single 
points of failure by removing master/slave relationships among 
processors, one! by providing dual paths to all subsystems. 
It provides the ability to replace defective components 
without interrupting application programs. The key ar­
chitectural features that underlie these capabilities are 
processor replication, dual-access I/O controllers, a redundant 
power system and a message-based operating system.
The Tandem Non-Stop system (See fig. Al-10) has from two to six­
teen processors which oomiautUcate over a high-speed duplex 16-bit 
parallel bus system. Disk mirroring (identical disk copies) may
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t’lGUHK Al-10 - The Tandem Non-Stop System [25]
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Bach processor is individually powered, and can shut down in­
dependently of the other system components. Bach processor has a 
copy of a guardian operating system, which maintains tables that 
reflect the status of available system resources. Processors are 
required to broadcast "I'm  alive" messages to all other proces­
sors, every secosd.
Check-Pointing.
For each running program, there is an identical, but semi- 
active back-up program in another processor. The back-up 
processor replaces the primary processor if it fails. The 
primary sends its back-up periodic bhack— point messages which 
define the state of the process at critical points in the com- 
gutation. When the operating system activates c the back-up, it 
resumes operation from the point which was defined at the last 
check-point. , 1
Message System.
Isolation of user processes from configuration details is 
provided by forcing all inter process communication to be 
carried out via a message system. This means that com­
munication is to logical devices, and the actual physical 
devices need not be controlled by the process. This isolation 
allows on-line repair, and graceful growth by plugging in ad­
ditional equipment.
I
Stratus developed the technique known ae "palr-and-a-spare" 
[25], in which major functions are replicated four times. 
Each of two self-checking subsystems consist of a pair of 
identical units that receive the same Inputs. If the outputs dis­
agree, then the subsystem ceases to operate, and the spare 
carries the load. Normally, a subsystem and Its spare run in 
close synchronization.
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When a repaired subsystem is returned to service, an interrupt 
informs the CPUs that it is now available* The repaired subsystem 
is then brought back into synchronization.
The scheme requires no recovery from a fault■ since work proceeds 
using the spare subsystem. To the user, the machine appears to be 
a conventional machine, requiring no special programming con­
siderations.
Al.4.3 The Resilient System [12]
The system uses two computers, both running the same 
software, but with only one active. Central to the 
fault-tolerant nature of this system is the reconfiguration 
monitor that operates as a number of discrete tasJcs. At the bas6 
of the reconfiguration. monitor is the kernel task, which 
monitors the current machine configuration and com­
municates with the other processor.
During normal operations, the kernel sends reassurance mes­
sages to the other CPU, and receives reassurance messages from 
it. When a reassurance message is not received by the back-up 
computer, the kernel takes control of the other system's ap­
plications .
The monitor runs in both computers. On detection of a
failure in the other system, the monitor activates bus.
switches to take over peripherals from the failed system, and
performs actions to load and restart the failed applica­
tion or system.
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Al,5 General Purpose Systems
M . 5 . 1  The Intel 432 SvstmSf (31) [5] [32J
The iAPX 432 system is designed for large-sc&le real-time con­
trol and transaction processing, Tire system is based on quad- 
modular redundancy. ^
Very large scale integration (VLSI) replication is used in the 
/stem, to construct sa family of configurations which coveir 
a range * of fault-toleraftce levels. Fault detection and 
recovery are performed in the VLSI component^. No additional 
logic or diagnostic software is needed.
In an iAPX 432-based system, there are three steps in 
responding to,an error: u
- error confinement
- error reporting ' v !
- error recovery
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Error confinement, {See fiff. Al-11)
APPENDIX 1
MODULE
X  SYSTEMINTERFACE
FIGURE Al-11 - Error Confinement Areas in the 432 System (5)
When an error is detected, it is confined to one of the sys­
tem building blocks. Recovery and repair Strategies are built 
around the block's replacement. When a module or bus has its 
confinement mechanisms activated, it becomes a self-checking 
unit. Detection mechanisms reside at every building block 
interface, and all data is checked as it flows across the inter­
face between confinement areas.
The confinement areas are enforced by applying five dif­
ferent detection mechanisms:
- duplication - when more than one version of a data element 
is available, comparison is possible
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- parity
- Hamming' coding
- time-outs - data must be available within a certain time
loop-back checks - suspected errors can be checked by 
trying _the operation again
Error Reporting,
Upon detection of an errtir, a message is broadcast to all the 
notUsa in the system, identifying th-r-^ulty confinement area, and 
the type of error. This message prevents other nodes from 
using' the faulty data, and provides,•L'-e.cavery information.
Error messages are broadcc-t over a set of serial busses that 
are independent of the 1 busses used during normal operation. 
The error message busses are subject to the same fault-tolerance 
principles used in the rest of the system.*
Error Recovery.
Each node reads the error report, and decides on the.action to 
be taken.
Five redundancy mechanisms exist in the s^ystem:
- single-bit error correction
- shadow modules
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Single-bit memory errors are corrected by the memory control
To guard against permanent faults, every self-checking 
module may be paired with another self-checking module of the 
same type. The pair of modules operate in lock-step 
synchronization, and provide back-up for all state in­
formation.
Such a configuration results in quad modular redundancy, be­
cause there a;*e four identical ujiits - two self— checking 
nodules, each with a master and shadow. 1
i1 ■
Each memory bus may be paired with akothei memory bus. Both are 
used in normal operation.
If a permanent fault is found, thja redundant resource is 
switched in ter replace the failed unit. No centralized ele­
ment controls the switch; each node kngws which other node it 
is shadowing, end when that node is identified as faulty, the 
back-up node becomes active and takes i over the operation.
After recovery is complete, hardware informs the software of the 
error and subsequent recovery actions. : The system software
then decides on the optimum configuration!
full capability and fault-tolerance retention, using a
- decreased capability, but full fault-tolerance, by 
switching out the the faulty pair
- full capability, but decreased fault-tolerance, by using the 
shadow on its own
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Levels of Fault-tolerance. (See fig. Al-12)
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which it occurrod. ial program flow is then interrupted
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FIGURE Al-12 - Levels of Confinement in the 432 System (5]
The cheapest reconfiguration relies on the built-in
fault-detection mechanisms such as bus parity,
error-correcting codes across memory arrays, and access 
retry. , Downtime ia required, when a fault is detected, to 
reinitialize the system, run a diagnostic program to locate the 
fault and reconfigure the system to disconnect the faulty 
module. The system will function with a lighter load until a re­
placement for the faulty module is available. The data base 
may be corrupted unless special software techniques are
used.
At the other end of the spoctrum, the sclf-healinfi system uses 
functional redundancy checking to detect errors as they oc­
cur, and to limit any detected error to the confinement area in
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for reconfiguration. Recovery time may be as long as a few 
seconds.
In 432 systems, the user is responsible for making I/O 
channels and controllers sufficiently secure, and for 
providing reliable clocks and power supplies.
The BFS is intended to find application in process control,
transaction processing and remote equipment.
The Concept of the BFS,
A number of objectives were to be met by the BFS;
- Hardware faults only were to be tolerated
Deterioration of system performance was permissible, but 
the system was to remain in working order for as long as
practicable
- The redundancy inherent in a multi-microcomputer 
system was to be utilized, to minimise the need for extra
redundancy
- Mutual monitoring by microcomputers was to be used 
-• Standard components were to be used
- A simple network structure was to be used 
Hardware Structure of the BFS.
The BFS is a multi-microcomputer structure, in which the in­
dividual microcomputers ore loosely coupled.
FAULT-TOLERANT
with each
arid itsconnected to its 
(See fig, Al-13)
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FIGURE Al-13 - The Structure of the BFS [11]
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Modules each: have a separate power supply, and use a six- 
card Multibus' system.
Software of the BFS.
Bach node has en individual operating isystora that makes it inde­
pendent of the other nodes. Since the "node hardware is identical, 
the same software can be used in them jail (See fig, Al-14).
1
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SOlSiBP -  sets ihe 5«ieH id ftlBtrwt stmt, rhd u*ds
TH£ RESPemVE 0PERSf|NS SYSTEMS OF THE HOOULE
FIGURE Al-14 - The Software S t V ^ e U r e  of the DPS [ U ]
Al .6 Summary
Numerous systems apply fault-tolerance techniques, especially in 
the fields of on-line ernnsaction processing and control of 
machinery.
An Important system is the SIFT system, which is intended for 
aircraft control. The system achieves improved reliability by 
having each iteration of the task executed by a number of
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processing modules. A processor requiring the results of any 
task (determines the value by obtaining the results from each 
processor which executed the task, and performing voting.
Also important is the FTMP system, which is again intended for 
aircraft control. An hybrid triple-modular redundant structure is 
used, with voting, being accomplished in hardware.
Other notable systems include the Triplex 32 programmable 
controller, the Agusta 129 flight control" system, and the 
Fault-tolerant Array Signal Processor.
Notable transaction processing systems are the tandem system, 
the Stratus system, and the Resilient system, while the Intel 
432 system, and the Basic Fault-tolerant System are prime 
general-purpose systems.
The study indicates that no dominant fault-tolerance technique 
has emerged. Some systems make use of replication, and others, 
back-up. Furthermore, there is no outstanding configuration 
within these techniques. Ik is therefore essential that 
systems be carefully designed for the particular application.
DATA FLOW TBCHWIQ;OESi APPENDIX 2
This appendix expands on the description of the data flow method 
of program development, given in Chapter 3.
A 2»1 Data Flow Di&fframa
The basic tool for utilising data flow is the data flow 
diagram. Five symbols are useci^ (I'S], (19]
—  rounded rectangles for functions (processes which
transform flows of data)
(opt.) identification
description of
'(opt.) physical location where 
performed (a,*, jprogram »as»e)
\
- arrows for flows of data
Description of Data
DATA FLOW TECHNIQUES
open-ended 1 rectangle for stores of data
/ mtUtiple left border implies duplication 
/  o| the store of data, elsewhere on the 
! tLilagrdrii
identification
4 squares for|:external sources or sinks of data
description 
of entity /shows that the block is 
duplicated elsewhere on 
the diagram
- small cirr^es for off-page connectors
identification
is/:,- %
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. Guidelines for drawing data-flow diagrams are [16)
- identify the external entities involved
-  identify the scheduled inputs and outputs involved
- _i->sntify the inquiries and on-demand requests for 
information that could arise
-  using a large sheet of paper, place the primary external 
entity on the left-hand side and draw the data flows that 
arise, the processes that are logically necessary and the 
data stores thtft are probably required
- draw tM. first draft fteehaod, including °e;v-eryth<tng 
except errors, 'exceptions and decisions v c ’ = ^
back with the list of inputs aiRd> outputs ,^a see if 
everything is included. Note the exclusions \
„ - r,produce a clearer second draft, using a; tamplaBe. Check 
and note exclusions -
" get a user to examine the draft
- produce a lower-level explosion of each process. Include 
errors and exceptions. Incorporate changes in the
top-level diagram
- produce a final top-level diagram '
A 2 .2 Data Dictionaries •f
A data dictionary is a store of descriptions of all entities 
in a system. . >■
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Data dictionaries can provide
ordered listings of all entries or various classes of 
entry, with full or partial detail
- comp'tisi-te tecords
- cross-Referencing ability 
' - names,from descriptions
- consistency,and completeness checking
- generation of machine readable <%ata definitions
- extraction of data dictionary entries from existing 
programs
Data elements are the smallest useful pieces of data. Data 
structures are made up of data elements ffnd other data 
structures. Dafra flows and data stores are data structures 
in motion and at rest respectively.
Typical data dictionary contents are
Data v lament descriptions
- description >
- optional - aliases for the data element
- related data elements ,
- range of values and meaning, of 
values
- data length
- encoding (ASCII, binary etc.)
- other editing .information
. i f ' V i
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Data structure descriptions
- description
- construction in terms of other entities;
- optional entities - (xxxxxxxx)
- alternate entities - {xxxxxxx,yyyyyyy)
- iterations jt? entities - xxxxx * (0 - 10)
possible numbers 
of iterations
Data flow descriptions
- names of data structures that pass along it
- source and destination of data flow
- volume of flow
- physical implementation if available
Data store descriptions
- names of data structures stored in it 
, - input and output data flows -
Processes
- name
-  names of inputs and outputs
- summary of the logic
- reference to the full functional specification
I # :
External entities
- names of associated data flows
- if person(s) - Number
- Identification
- if another system - Language
- Informatioi
-
r.'- ^
-t- :
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Glossary entries
- description of esoteric terms
A2i 3 Data Stores
It is usually easier to change the logic of a process than 
to change the structure of a data base. However, it is 
possible to refine data bases to their simplest form.
A2.4 Deriving a Structured Design from the logic model [16]
There are throe main design objectives
- performance - in throughput* run-time, or response time
- control - security
- changeability - for enhancements and pcst-production
debugging
The principle that the essential form of a program piece is
1 - Get input
2 - Perform transformation
3 - Produce output
is adhered to.
To get from a data flow diagram to an hierarchical
structure, one starts with the rawest form of input and
traces it through the data flow until the point is reached
DATA FLOW TECHNIQUES APPENDIX 2
where it can no longer be said to be input. Likewise, the 
output is traced back into the system until it can no longer 
be thought of as output. The middle piece of the system 
forms the transformation section.
Tree structure diagrams ttre used to represent the 
hierarchical system.
SOFTWARE DEBUGGING TECHNIQUES APPENDIX 3
This appendix expands on the techniques of program debugging, 
which were briefly covered in Chapter 3.
A3.1 Guidelines While Writing Code
- avoid using GOTO
- design modular programs
- program for clarity and optimize later
- avoid system-dependent code
- produce good documentation
A3,2 Assumptions in Debugging
it is necessary to ensure that the bugs.which show up on the 
execution of application programs are present in the program 
itself. Therefore it must be proved, or assumed that
- the computer is never at fault
“ the system software is never at fault
A3,3 Debugging Practice
- keep- a written record of debugging
- save a copy of the program before the latest fix
- make sure the listing :1s current
test multiple variations of the program, each with only one 
change in it
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- watch out for 1,1,1 and 0,0
- he aware of the particular problems of a language
- rewriting may be faster than debugging 
A3,4 J
Techniques for eliminating visible errors
Indirect We* "^run the program
,,4.ook at the documentation 
y'browse through the debugging notebook
PRINT statementsA.J) unconditional '
- conditional
- to screen, printer or disk
'Breakpoints, 1
: - - : -tf'-
Snapshots. a printed record of the •state of the 
machine
Finding hidden ^rrofs and verifying program correctness
Force and check with simple data.
Anticipating future errors (preventative debugging)
Sir aping debug instructions- - 4ro invoked only when abnormal'- 
conditions occur
Firewalling. - chock data before leaving modules
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This appendix /elaborates on the techniques of self testing in 
computer systems.
hi ,1 Introduction
Errors in a computer system may be caused by [33]i
- Algorithm faults .. >■
- Programming mistakes
- - Component faults ■
lest programs, which exercise the computer, are "useful in 
detecting the failure of a component. Algorithm faults and 
programming Bistakes must be removed using conventional 
debugging techniques.
Testing of < microprocessors is made difficult because the 
working details of the microprocessor are not usually 
syailabls to the user. Tor testing, therefore, the 
microprocessor is generally split up into functional units. An 
additional hindrance to sierop.roceeeor testing is the fact 
that.matiy data and eontral p«6hs within the machine are - not 
directly aocessi&lsu
Built-In Self-Test (BIST) can be defined as the capability for a 
product (chip, multi-chip assembly or system) to test it­
self, with input stimulation or output evaluation, or both, 
being integral to the product and not requiring external test 
equipment [34].
The problem of self-testing is compounded by the fact that the 
instructions used for testing may themselves be faulty.
SELF TESTING: THEORY AND PRACTICE APPENDIX 4
A4.2 Testing Theory 
A.4.2,1 Introduction
The models described in this section are used in the 
functional testing of microprocessors [35],
For teat generation purposes, the microprocessor is rep­
resented in terms of its functional units. Then a fault model 
is developed for each of these functions.
A.4.2.2 Instruction -model
An instruction I is composed of a sequence of
microinstructions { m  ,me ntk }. Each microinstruction is
made up of microorders (uji ,uja ,..,ujq ) which are executed 
in parallel.
k is the number of microinstructions in instruction I and q  is 
the number of microordera:in microinstruction j.
A4.2.3 Microprocessor model
A microprocessor is represented by a graph, which consists of 
nodes representing
- a register, or t,
- a set of equivalent registers, or
- the special nodes IN or OUT
IN represents the source of oil control/data input, while OUT 
represents the sink of all control/data output.
The nodes a& e connected by directed edges if and only if 
there is an instruction which causes the transfer of data from 
one node to the other.
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A 4 .2 Testing Theory 
A'i.2> 1- Introduction
The models described in this section are used in the 
functional testing of microprocessors [35].
For test generation purposes, microprocessor is rep­
resented in terms of its functional u«ito. Then a fault model
is developed for each of these functions,
A4.2.2 Instruction model
An instruction I is composed of a sequence of
microinstructions (mi ,«a ...... ,ait } . B^ch microinstruct.on is
made up of microorders (uj i , Uj 2 , ,  ,uaq J which are executed
in parallel. \
k is the number of inicroiiistructions in instruction I and q is 
the number of microorders in microinstruction J .
A4.2.3 Microprocessor model
A microprocessor is represented by a graph, Which consists of 
nodes representing
- a register, dr
- a set of equivalent registers, dr
- the special nodes IN' or OUT •
IN represents the source of ull control/data input, while OUT 
represents the sink of all control/data outputt
The nodes are connected by directed edges if and only if 
there is an instruction which causes the transfer of data from 
one node to the other.
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Registers are equivalent with respect to an instruction set if 
and only if any instruction which uses one of the 
registers could use another.
A4.2.4 Fault Models
The microprocessor is decomposed into the following units:
- register decoding function
- data transfer paths
- arithmetic and logic unit
- instruction sequencing and control function
Fault model for the register decoding function.
f (Ri ) = the regia ter decoding function d
= Ri in the fault-free case
= Rj or 0 or {Ri ,Rj ) in the faulty case
Fault model for the data transfer function.
Under a fault
- any number of data transfer lines can be stuck at 0 or 1
- any pair of lines can be coupled
Fault model for the data manipulation function.
The model depends on the architecture of the
microprocessor. The test set consists of instructions to trans­
fer the data from memory to the source registers, instruc­
tions to perform the operation under test, and instructions 
to , «d the result from the destination to memory.
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Fault model for the instruction sequencing function.
Under a fault, one or more of the following occurs
- one or more microorders is inactive
- microorders that are normally inactive become active
- incorrect microinstructions are active 
A faulty instruction can be represented as 
F(r) = I + d+ - d*
where d* ia the set of extra microinstructions 
d" is the set of lost microinstructions 
A 4 ,3 Test Procedures 
A 4 .3.1 Introduction
There are three types of routine used in Ihe testing process
- test routines, which detuct errors
- diagnostic routines, which locate faults
- executive routines, which control the overall process
Some parts of the machine to be tested must be operative in or­
der to perform any program tests, In particular, once It is 
verified that the read instructions are foult-froe, the correct 
functioning of the remaining instructions can u.- then tested 
by first reading codewords into the internal registers, 
followed by executing the instructions and reading all the 
registers.
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A4.3.2 Error detection !'i
To detect the presence of faults, it is essential that tbe ef­
fects of the faults show up as erroneous d&ta.
Built-In Checks [36}' . '
Such checks use special,hardware and/or codes incorporated into 
the - computer or system and are normally designed to detect a
cerfeain class of error only. The chief forms of this type of
check', are . .
- data transfer checks e.g. parity, Hamming etc. 
data storage checks e.g. memory duplication
- arithmetic checks e.g. ...register overflows,1 out-of-range 
checks etc.>
Programmed Checks - ( k
The selection of programmed error detection and correction 
methods must be based on several factors [33]
- the probability of eatih type of malfunction and its
detection and correction by a particular technique
. - the probable damage produced by different malfunctions
- .the cost of additional storage end increased computing speed 
requirements
The programmer must establish tolerances on allowable dis­
crepancies , and the degree of confidence to be placed in a 
particular type of check. He should also decide on the frequency 
with which the various checks are to be applied.
jjSvti
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Four testing methodologies have been applied [37}
exhaustive'testing - All combinations of data pattern and 
instructions are^ tested. This gives 100% fault coverage
for all non-redundant faults, provided that they do not make 
the system .sequential-' The test time of this method is long, and 
grows exponentially as fche width of the data flow increases-
- random>: pattern testing - A randomly chosen subset of the 
exhaustive test is used, sufficient to give an acceptably 
high fault coverage. However, prediction of fault coverage is 
difficult, and many structures are not random-pattern testable.
pseudo-exhaustive testing - The method seeks to par­
tition the system logically rather than physically, and then
to exhaustively test each, partition. This allows broader 
descriptions and models. However, the partitioning may te ex­
pensive to ac'omplish.
- hybrid testing - Logic can be divided into a number of 
cones, each consisting" of all the logic that feeds -a single 
output. It is not necessary to test the , entire system,- only 
each individual cone. c
While the .eVs that exercise the machine are being
carried out, it is useful to assign unique codewords to each 
register. Before the test is r u n , the registers are loaded 
with their codewords, and when the test is complete, the 
registers are checked to see that they are as they should be.
Certain basic instructions must- be operative in order for tests 
to be carried o u t .■These are.
- memory to register transfer
- register to register comparison
- conditional branch
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The instructions allow the loading and comparison of data, and 
the branching to an error handling routine if there is an error.
Comprehensive tes.t sequences will utilize every command in the 
machine, and exercise every accessible element in the computer. 
The blocks of code can be scattered throughout the memory to in­
crease the probability that an error .will cause a transfer to 
an illegal memory.location which.will can; be filled with an 3ALT 
instruction [38].
The test sequences perform ■
command tests - All commands ,yith oil possible in­
struction options are tested. Two methods are possible
(1) The result of an operation is obtained in two dif­
ferent ways; once using the instruction to be tested, and 
once using a sequence of other instructions that simulate 
that instruction. Different pseudo.rrandom numbers are used as
test data. - -
(2) Instructions are; repeated with different data, and th’' 
results are compared with stored, precomputed answers.
- memory tests - A block . of words ' is "etipied to a tem­
porary location and the two blocks ore compared. Next, test 
data are written into the block, and into another temporary 
location, The blocks are compared add then the original data is 
returned to the tested block.
accumulator tests - The accumulator is caused to count by 
ones, and the end result is compared with the correct answer,
addressable device and register tests - Specialized I/O
test routines are used. The main machine must be operating
correctly before these tests can be made.
SELF TESTING: THEORY AND PRACTICE APPENDIX 4
- bus testa - Tq effectively test a bub, it is neceSsary . to 
drive the bus from each possible register in -turn, while col­
lecting a signature in all receiving registers.
Tests may also be built into the application programs [36]. The 
basic procedures are [33]
“ rjscoraputation by the same, an inverse, or a different 
process and comparison of the results. ^
- tests to see if the results satisfy certain mathematical or 
physical criteria
- checks based on estimates of behaviour
- special checks for a particular process Or machine
Careful consideration must be given to .the number of opera- \ 
tions to be cjovered by a single check. Tolerances" should be 
provided because tif truncation and roundoff.
Acceptance Checks [2®L_
Acceptance tests are designed to ensure that the system i s f u l l y  
operational and that all the system facilities'’'^are complete 
and working before acceptance of the system by the customer.
The acceptance procedure is generally based o n " ^  test cycle, 
comprising both engineering test programs and operational 
programs.
i
A4 .3.3 Error I.ORgjnfl and Control j'
While there are no errors, the test Sequences are repeated a 
specified number of times. Pseudo-random numbers are gen­
erated for test data. Status messages are printed. These meas 
sages typically specify the sequence just . rtih
successfully, the sequence which will be ru;. next, and the fiion- ' '
BhW —aj t <-
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tents of the registers. Major errors will usually result in the 
tests being, run in the incorrect order, or at erratic times.
When an error i.S detected, the' error routine adds to an error 
count and outputs an error message. The test sequence is repeated 
to indicate whether the fault is transient or permanent. If two 
successive tests show the same error, then the fault is con­
sidered, permanent. Otherwise it is transient, vand the application 
program, can continue.
A4.3.4 Error Diagnosis
A diagnostic program its usually employed to locate the source of 
an error once it is 'known to exist. It is useful to have separate 
diagnostic programs for different parts of the.system. The loca­
tion of-a fault resultii in a record being made of the error’s 
probable cause.
Diagnostic tests are not generally useful to locate faults in 
certain important control circuits or in the power supply.
A 4 .4 Preventative Maintenance
V  ■ ■
Preventative maintenance should bti applied -frcT'systems, in addi­
tion to their self-testing. This maintenance will include mar­
ginal testing, where components of the sy^'t^m are driven at the 
extremes of their specifications. Such t b s M n g  can show'up the 
imminent failure of an ailing component, thereby allowing repairs 
to be made before errors arc caused.
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This appendix provides full details regarding the hardware used 
to implement the experimental system.
A 5 .1.1 Overview
Typical uses include -
i - multiprocessing single board computer
ii - mass storage front-end processor
iii - stand-alone single board system 
AS.1.2 Functional Description
The SBO is functionally partitioned into six main 
sections
- central processor
The 80186 combines DMA, interval timers, clock gen­
erators and a programmable interrupt controller 
into one chip.
The 80186 instruction set includes all the 8086 
instructions, while adding 
block I/O
enter and leave subroutines
push immediate
multiply quick
array bounds checking
shift and rotate by immediate
pop and push all
The 80130 component provides the iRMX 86 nucleus 
primitives, timers and programmable interrupt
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control. This adds to the 80186 instruction set, 
providing 35 operating system primitive functions, 
and supporting five new data types.
The 80186 provides three 16-bit programmable 'timers. 
Two of theie are connected to four output pins, and 
can be used to count external events, time external 
.events, generate non-repetitive waveforms", etc. As 
shipped, " "the timers provide baud rate generation. 
Tbe third timer is not coiw,actiid to output pins, and 
is useful for real-time coding, time-delay 
applications, prescaling the other timers, or as a 
DMA request source. <■
The 80130 provides three more 16-bit programmable 
timers. One is used as a baud rate generator, 
another ss a system timer, and the third is reserved 
for use by  the 80130’s iRMX nucleus.
- memory
There are eight JEDBC 28-pin memory si^es o n 1 the 
SBO. Four of the sites are EPROM sites, and four are 
RAM sites. The use of an expansion module will add 
four more RAM sites. Memory deyice ty^e size are', 
jumper-selected. ?
The four EPROM sites are top-justified in thts 1Mbyte 
address space, and must contain the power-up 
instructions. The four RAM sites are, by default, 
located starting at address 0 .
Power-fail control and auxiliary power are provided 
for the protection of the HAM sites.
- small computer system interconnect (SCSI) peripheral 
interface
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This interface consists of three 8-bit parallel 
ports, which may be configured as general-purpose 
I/O, SCSI or DMA-controlled centronics-compatible 
line printer interfaces.
- serial I/O
J!wo programmable communications. interfaces are 
provided. 80186 timer'' outputs are used as 
software-selectable baud reto generators.
The mode of operation (asynchronous, byte 
synchronous or bisynchronous protocols), data 
format, control character format, p a r i t y  -and baud 
rate are under program control.
- interrupt control
27 on-board vectored interrupt levels, to service 
interrupts generated from 33 possible sources, are 
provided.
The 90186, 8259A, and 8274 PIOs act as ..slaves to the 
80130 master PIC,
The highest priority interrupt is the non-maskable 
interrupt (MMI) line, which i| connected directly to 
the 80186 and is typi-pa/ly used to-- signal 
catastrophic events, \
- MULTIBUS bus expansion
The SBC provides the A., - i.-x/s system b us, which 
supports 8- and 16-bit SBCs and.peripherals, with 
20 or 24 address and 16 data lines
iLBX bus ~ a local bus extension, allowing 
on-board memory performance with off-btiard memory
■"f
A S /
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iSBX bus - multi-module on-board expansio 
allowing additional I/O functions to be added
iRMX 86 Release 6 can be uaed, or CP/M firmware can be 
supplied using the 80150.
AS.1.4 Development Environment
Using iRMX 86 Release 6 , software-'^development can be 
■ performed directly on the SB C , or by using one of the 
compatible development systems.
AS,2 The DT732 input/oufepul: board [39J ' '
AS.?. 1 Djsaci!iP_tlon
Ihtoi I/O board is memory mapped, with,9 jumper-Gelectable 
base address over a 20— bit address range. K blbck <5f 16 
con tiguous addreesF bytet, ^ t a ^ t i n g  at the. base address,,, 
provides access tc ypi*. Hip v. control# data and channel 
addtfess registers requic6«'^for programming purposes.
Analog input features . ;
- 32 single-ended or 16 differential channels \
- sample and hold circuitry «
- fast A/D converter
- software programmable gain amplifier (gain = 1 , 2 , 4  , 
or 8)
- jumper-selectable full scale input ranges (+/- 10 V, 
+/- 6 V, 0-10 V, 0-5 V)
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- 4-20 mA current loop output
- +/- 0,06% non-linearity over full scale range
- 24 000 samples per second
(
A crystal-controlled "pacer" start clock is available 
for _  generating any one of ten jumper-selectable time 
periods from 1 ms bo 1 s for synchronizing A/D
conversions.
A variety of sampling modes is • available
- repetitive single channel
- random access - i
- channel scan „ '
Sampling may bo triggered in three ways
- programmed J/o ' :»
- on board pacer sample timer . i
- external trigger ^
Separately enabled interrupt# ■ caused"- by either the 
»nd_of_conversion or end_of_, re£•/conditions can be 
routed to the MULTIBUS.
Analog output features
- 2 channels
- 12-bit resolution
jumper-selectable output ranges (+/- 10 V> +/- 5 V, 
0-10 V, 0-5 V)
ii!
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- 4-20 mA current loop for each output 
Software
The I/O board operates under iRMX 80.
NOTE: References are to the handbook for the board [39]
.Analog Inputs
input impedance - power on: 100 Mohw (win.)
- power off: 1,5 kohm (min.)
max input voltage without damage - power on: +/- 35 V 
- power off: +/- 20 V 
sample and hold - aperture time: 10;A  na
- uncertainty time: 20 ns
- linearity: +/“ 1/2 LSD
system non-linearity - gain = 1: 0,05* FSR +/- 1/2 LSJ3 
- gain = 2,4,8: 0,0?JS FSR +/” 1/2 L 
common mode vollatfo range: +/-'10,24 V 
CMRR: 60 db ■
x' external trigger: TTL Schmitt trigger, edge sensitiveii 
triggers on the falling edge 
+5 V to G V for 200 ns (min.)
50 ns rise time (max,) 
digital output encoding (jumper selectable)i
- bipolar: offset binary or 2 's compliment
- unipolar: straight binary
- current loop: straight binary
Analog Outputs
K >
slew rate: .10 V/ us (no load capticitantie) 
settling time: 4 us to +/- I LSB 
accuracy: +/- 0,05* FSR
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output current: +/- 5 mA at •+/- 10 V
short circuit protected 
digital input encoding: straight binary 
2 's compliment 
offset binary 
output - impatience: 0,2 ohms
- capacitance: 1000 pF (max.)
User Connections
Output and input channels both use 50-pin edge 
connectors, with.2,54 mm spacing. One is used for the 
outputs, and two for the inputs.
(The connectors are 3M 3416-000. or TIK 312L25)
Cables are flat or twisted pair.
(EP 036 or EP 086)
AS. 2.3 „U
Parameter Relevant Figs Notes •
Base address 
renisve jumper 200-201
A/D input range and 
configuration, and 
output coding
3.1 3.a 3.3 
3,4 3.5 3.6
For IB-bit addresses,
When the input range is 
changed the A/D converter 
should be 
recalibrated.
For 4-20 mA inputs, the 
input must be 
differential. User- 
supplied 250 ohm 1/4 W +/- 
2% 0,5 ppm/degree C shunt 
resistors should be used.
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Parameter Relevant Figs Botes
D/A output range and 
input coding
3.7 3.8 3.9 
3.10
Simultaneous voltage and 
current outputs are 
possible. Whenever the 
range is changed,, the D/A 
converter should be 
recalibrated.
Internal pacer clock- 
period
3.11 3.12 When an external trigger 
is used, the pacer cJ^cjk 
must be disabled 
by disconnecting pin 40 
from any other pins and 
connecting it to pin 39
Interrupts 3.13.3.14 
3.15 3.16
CINT A and INT B may be set 
to trigger at EOC, EOS or 
upon tfi'meout of the pacer
Transfer acknowledge 3.17 It .is sometimes necessary 
to delay this signal match 
the XACK/ to the host to 
the computer timing
INH1/ and INH2/ 3.19 If the I/O board occupies 
the signals same.memory 
space as RAM or ROM, it 
may be configured to in­
hibit RAM ( i m u / )  or ROM 
(INH2/) when the I/O board 
is accessed
Factory Defaults 3.20 3.21 
3.22 3.23
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A5.2.4 Input and Output Connections 
Input Connections 
Analog input connection schemes
d  .
- single-ended inputs - refer to figures 4,1 and 4.2
common-mode rejection is Lost
- use high -level inputs (> 1 V FSR)
- use short lead lengths (< 1 m)
- differential inputs - refer to figure 4.3
- common-mode rejection is obtained
- low-level inputs may be used
- lead lengths are not restricted
- current loop inputs - refer to figure 4.4
Output Connections
For simultaneous voltage and current output, the 
jumpers must be set for current output. The current 
loop connects to "DAC x I out" and "DAC x I Rtn” ; the 
voltage output connects to "DAO- x V out" and "DAC x 
Ana Gnd", Only the current is calibratable. Refer to 
figure 4.5.
If the on-board dc-dc converter is to be used ns power 
supply to the current loop, " + 15 V out" must be 
connected to "DAC x ’ •'-.p V+” .
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A3.2.5 Architecture and Programming 
The address base is sat to 0F7Q0H when shipped. 
Memory Address Assignments 
Refer to figure 5.1.
Analog Input Registers
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Register Relevant Fig
command 5.2
status
start channel 
and gain
5.4
last channel 
address
5.5
clear interrupts 5.6
ADC data 5.7
Analog Output Registers
The lower byte must be written first. The conversion 
takes place when the higher byte is written.
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Analog Input Function
-• random channel input - write to the start channel 
; and’gain register
write to the command register
„  conversion takes place
subsequent channels are selected by a write to the 
start channel and gain register, before a read of 
the last converted channel -
a read of the high byte '. last converted
channel enables the next 9. inversion
repetitive single channel conversion :
write to the start channel and gain register
write to the command register.,
reading the high byte enables the next conversion 
- sequential input scan
write to the start channel and gain register
write to the last channel address register
write to the command register
reading the high byte enables the next conversion
!
(check that the "A/D conversion done" bitj is set)
when the BOS bit is set, reading the high byte 
resets it
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A/D converter trigger
Unless an external trigger is specified, A/D 
conversions are started automatically by a software 
trigger whenever a data word is written, enabling 
the conversion.
Testing of the board is described in appendix 6 .
A5.3 The Modular Servo System (40} [41] [42]
' A5.3.1 Introduction
The servo system is a velocity lag position control 
system With a d.c. error channel using potentiometers, 
with provision for -inserting linearizing networks to 
simulate a single time-constant system.
It is used for demonstrating and teaching automatic 
control techniques to students and technicians. It 
comprises modular units for individual study and for the 
construction of speed and position controls using d.c. 
error signals.
A5.3.2 Closed Loop Systems
Since a closed-loop system is "error operated", it 
contains the facility to compensate for any departure of 
the output from the required condition set by the input, 
since this departure changes the error causing a 
correcting signal to be applied to the forward path. 
Oscillations may set in, however, causing the system to
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A 5 .3.3 Motor Characteristics
Operation of the Motor
Armature control or field control can be selected by 
inserting appropriate links in the servo amplifier,
b, Tachog^nerator Calibration
A gear system of ratio 30:1 rotates a low-speed shaft. 
The rotations of this shaft can be counted and the 
tachogenerator output measured, giving the 
voltage/speed ratio, Kg. This should be about 2,5 
3,0 volts gef 1000 r .p.m. of the motor.
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A5.3.4 Soaed Control of the Motor (Refer to fig. A5-I)
SUPPLY
gESDBACK
MOTOR]
A5-1 - Block Di- Control CircuitF H of a
The steady-state operating conditions of a ideal system 
may be represented by
HARDWARE DETAILS
K = forward path gain
i
E = error ^ignal
Now B = Vref - Kg 0
where Vref = reference voltage 
Kg = tachogenerator tfdtiatant
0 = K(Vref - KffO)
If the forward path gain K is largo, and Kg is
APPENDIX 5
constant,
0 is proportional to Vref
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a, Properties of the Operational Amplifier Unit (Refer to fig. 
A5-2;
p.r
FIGURE A5-2 - The Op. Amp. Circuit
Vo = -R2/R1 (VI V2 + V3) 
for large A.
A zero setting is provided.
b . Simple Speed Control System
The servo amplifier requires a positive input to 
rotate the motor. Hence, the voltage applied to the 
inverting op. amp. must be negative.
The tnchogenerator voltage must, be connected to oppose 
the reference voltage.
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A5.3.5 Position Control System (Refer to fig. A5-3)
For this purpose, a potentiometer is connected to the 
low speed motor output shaft.
AMP.
. O U T P U T
FIGURE A5-3 - Bloch D <gram of a Simple Position Control 
Circuit
The volts/degree ratio, Ho, is approximately IV per 10 
degrees, or 0,1 V per degree.
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Due to inertia of the motor, the system may overshoot 
the required position. To reduce the settling time, an 
output can be taken from the tachogenorator of such 
polarity as to oppose the error signal.
A5.3.6 Circuit Notes
a. Operational Amplifier Unit
The unit consists of an op. amp. plus input and 
feedback components. There is provision for external 
feedback components.
The nominal output is +/- 10 V, +/- S mA max.
b. Pre-amplifier Unit
The pre-amplifier unit provides suitable
positive-going signals for both inputs of the servo
amplifier to enable the motor to be driven in both
directions by a signal applied to this unit.
External compensation circuits can be plugged into the 
unit if required.
c. Servo Amplifier
The armature or field configuration is selected .by 
inserting links in this unit.
d. Motor/tachogenerator Unit
If the motor Is 
should rotate ut a
connected for armature control, it 
urront of about 0,9 A.
The tochogenerntor ripple voltage is t/- 0,25 V pe: 
at 1800 r.p.m.
I/O BOARD CONFIGURATION AND TESTING APPENDIX 6
This appendix describes the configuration and testing of the I/O 
board, including its insertion into the memory address space on 
the Multibus system, atid the configuration of the input and out­
put characteristics. Exact connections are given to provide a 
record of the configuration details.
. -  - /-i:
System Firmware
Available
Memory
COMMON
MEMORY
COMMON
MEMORY
Available 
Memory 
* -__
Available
Memory
I/O BOARD CONFIGURATION AND TESTING APPENDIX 6
A6 .2 I/O Board Address
The I/O board uses 12 bytes of contiguous memory, starting 
at a base address, which is jumper-selected to be on any 
l6~bvte boundary. Since no other peripherals are to be 
used, 0E7000H was chosen.
A6 .3 I/O Board Configuration
A6.3.1 Base Address
0B7000H
20-bit address, so insert jumper 200—201
lADDRx/ ! Value i Header #!
I/O BOARD COWFIGCfRATrOR AND TRSTrwG
Input range: +~ 10 V
Insert jumpers
Remove jumpers
Configuration: diff<
Insert jumpers
Remove jumpi
Coding: offset binary
Insert jumper - 66-1
Remove jumpei
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I/O CONFIGURATION AND TESTING
A6.3.3 D/A Output Range and Coding
Output range: +- 10 V
Insert jumpers
Remove jumpers
9A-10A
Insert jumpers - 15-17 
18-19
Remove jumpers
15-16
18-20
Coding: offset binary
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Itisert jumper - 46-4?
Remove jumper - 45-46
A6.3.4 Pacer Clock Period
Trigger: factory default (Is)
Pins connected to pin 40 - 38
Pins not connected - PS,30,£1,32,33,34,36,36,37
Interrupt: factory default <977us)
Pins connected to pin 41 - 28 
Pins not connected - 30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38 
A6.3.5 Interrupts
Int A: not connected 
Int B: not connected
Pins not connected - 63,64,65,78,79,80,81,82,83, 
84,85,86,87,96
. 1
74B-76
74A-73
75A--72;
Factory default
Insert jumpers - 97-98
Remove jumper - 98-!
A6.3.8 Memory Inhibit Signals
RAM inhibit! not asserted
Remove jumper - K3-K4
,,
&;■
i
ROM inhibit: not assorted
Remove jumper - K6-K6
. . J  •
> V .\
A: A;X 
: A  :
I/O BOARD CONFIGURATION AND TESTING 
A6.4.1 Oablin
APPENDIX 6
Multibus Syst’em
I N.C.
Distribution Box
\
0 DAC +v i
1 DAG 0 Return
2 DAC 1 +V 1
3 1 Returh
4 ADC 0 Hi 1.
5 ADC 0 Do
6 ADC 1 Hi
7 1 Lo
8 2 Hi
9 ADC 2 Lo
ADC 3 Hi
B ADC 3 Lo '
Ci Analog Ground
|A
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Output (Jl)
1 ! nc nc .21
3 1 nc nc 41
5 i „ nc nc 51
7 ! nc nc .81
9 ! nc nc 10 !
1 1 ! nc nc 12 !
•13! nc nc 14!
151 nc nc I;6 !
no 1:8 !
nc 2i0 !
2 1 ! nc nc api
2;4!
25! nc nc 2 6 !
27! nc . nc 2 BI
29! nc nc 301
31! nc nc 32!
33! nc nc 34!
35! nc 1 V out 3 P !
37! 1 I rtn 38!
39! 1 A gnd lLoopV+ 4pl
0 V out 4:21
43! 0 I rtn 0 I out 44!
461 O A  gnd 0LoopV+ 46:
Ana gnd 48!
49! -ISVout +lGVout 50!
Input {J2)
1 21
ana gnd (OR) 41
ana gnd (OL) 6 !
7 ana gnd 1 (1H) 8 !
9 ana gnd (11) 1 0 !
11 ana gnd (2H) 1 2 !
13 ana gnd 10 (21) 14!
15! ana gnd (3H) 16!
17! ana gnd 11 (31) 18!
19 ana gnd 4 (4H) 2 0 !
21 ana gnd 12 (41) 2 2 !
23! ana gnd , (5H) 24!
25! ana gnd (51) 261
gnd (6H) 28!
ana gnd 14 (61) 30!
311 ana gnd (7H) 32!
ana gnd 15 (71) 34!
35! nc nc 36!
37! nc 38!
39 dig gnd ck out 40 !
41 dig gnd 42!
43 dig gnd EOC out 44!
40 dig gnd EOS out 461
47 ana gnd gnd 48!
49 -ISVout +15Vout 50!
VI/O BOARD CONFIGURATION AND TESTING
4.2 Distribution Box Wiring
APPENDIX 6
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A6.4.3 D-connecfcor configuration
Computer!
"iption Wire Colour
Diet. Box
Pin line', Pin
1 out White 3
2 ' 1 out
3 ; 1 Loipp V+
4 ! 0 out Yellow 1
5 9 : 0 out
6 11 ! 0 Black 5
7 13 S 0 I Brown . s
8 15 i 1 Green 7
9 17 ! Purple 8
10 19 ! Blue
11 21 : Orfinge 10
12 23 ! 3 Turquoise 11
13 25 ! .3 ! ■ Pink 12
14 ! 1 rtn
16 ! 1 anu gnd 4
16 !
17 ! 0
18 10 i ansi gnd Grey 2
19 12 i ena gnd ■Shield 13
20 14 ! anu gnd
21 16 ! ana gnd
22 18 ! gnd
23 20 ! ana gnd
24 22 ! ana gnd
25 24 ! S«d
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A6.5 Testing
made to the handbook for the I/O
board [39]
D/A Calibration
Gain Adjust Offset Adjust
irovidc output codes is available
load impedam
equipment required
the' +/•precision decimal pi;
iltmeter - to analog ground of DAO
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- calibration
allow 1 hour for the system to warm up 
refer to figure 7.1 
unipolar offset (0-10 V and 0-6 V) 
output 00H and adjust for 0 V 
unipolar gain
output OFFFH and adjust according to the table 
bipolar offset (+/- 10 V and +/- 5 V) '■
output 00H and adjust for minus full scale ; 
bipolar gain
output OFFFH and adjust for full scale - 1 tSB 
A/D Calibration
- assumptions
software to provide readings and display them is 
available
calibration is on channel 0 , with all other channels 
returned to analog common
in^ut cable length < 3 m
- equipment required
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- single-endetl operation - see the figure on page 2
' ^ (5 differential o p e r a t i o n s e e / |  the figure on page 4
- - calibration .
 2 alloku-l-h-fAH— jyr the system to warm up
/  ' unipolar zero
".y set gain bo 1
input 1 LSB and adjust the offset for 1 count
; " set^g-ain to S , ‘
input 1 LSB and adjust the amplifier ofA^at for 1 
" ' count<)as» sto'biyn in the table dn pag@ 6
■; o  unipolar full scale
set gain to 1
input full scale - 2 LSBs and adjust according to 
the table on page
-  . . )  ■ ”
bipolar zero ^
set gain to 1
input - full scale + 1 LSB and adjust the zero 
potentiometer according to the table on page 9
set gain to S
adjust the auxiliary zero
bipolar full scale
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. set gain to 1
i«put full scale -> Z\LSBs and adjust according to 
the table on page 6
iA6 ,5.2 Calibration
Analog output required no calibration.
Analog input 0 was tied to analog output 0, and the number 
of erroneous readings was minimized by adjustment to the 
‘offset and gain.
After calibration, the average error rates were 
Single-bit errors - 1 in 1833 samples
Multiple-b.it errors - 0
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A7 .1 Introduction
The requirements for the software part of the system were gen­
erated by examination of the system functional specifications, 
This appendix provides the full Software Requirements document; 
discussed in chapter 5,
Eight major functions are required'of the software;
- Task I/O handling
Self and mutual testing of nodes <i
- Time-Staggered operation /
- -Watchdog timing.
- Error handling
- Task control . *
- Inter-node communication
- System initialization 
A7.2 Task I/O Handling
Task I/O handling is the most important fault .tolerance 
feature of the system. It is expected that this utility will 
provide the most meaningful system .failure-avoidance
capability, in that the task I/O handling routines will 
prevent the production of erroneous outputs, and also inhibit 
the spreading of errors through the application system
software.
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A7.2,I I/O Device Checks
Because the system is intended for use in e control environment, 
input and output devices are of prime importance. No matter how 
fault tolerant the computer •system is, undetected sensor and 
servo failures will override its effect and cripple the system ,as 
a whole. For this reason, it is important that regular checks on 
the I/O devices are made, especially when they are about to be
For output devices, reedback and feedback checking of output 
channels must be supported, while for input devices, input 
reasonableness and consistency checks must be supported.
If errors are detected, these must be signalled so that the 
operating system can take appropriate action.
A7 .2.2 I/O Request Servicing
In order for the application system to make use of 
fault-tolerance procedures, I/O request servicing must be 
provided, This will enable application modules to call 
operating system routines which perform input or output (as 
required) in a fault-tolerant manner.
The key aspect of I/O servicing is the application of voting on 
the data supplied by each node. Errors can , thus be 
eliminated, and faulty nodes pinpointed.
It is necessary that, once a voting operation has been per­
formed on an input to a task, all nodes use the same input 
value in their calculations; otherwise different answers may 
be produced, causing confusion in the voting process. (This 
requirement is based on the proposal that, given the same input 
data and the same process by which to transform that data, 
identical machines will produce identical answers).
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To provide full facilities for application programs, all 
types of task I/O, including memory modifications (i.e. RAM 
output) and memory data input, as well as other peripheral I/O 
types must be catered for in the I/O request servicing package.
Of particular importance to the target application, multi-input 
servo device handling must be included.
A7.2.3 I/O Records
Throughout the various operating system sections, good 
records oust be maintained, for two main reasons:
to enable the operating system to perform fault diag­
nosis when necessary
to allow system monitoring at various development phases and 
for maintenance and repair
As with other operating system sections, I/O records include two 
parts of the fault-tolerance record structure, namely error 
records and fault records. Error records will consist of notes 
of any errors detected, as well as any other information as 
may be determined. Similarly, fault records will consist of 
notes of all faults found by the mechanisms.
In addition, the I/O request servicing section of the system must 
maintain a list of the I/O devices together with their opera­
tional status and notes about peculiarities of the devices 
(such as replication of input devices and dual inputs to 
output devices).
A7.3 Self and Mutual TestiHif
Equipment-testing programs are primarily intended to forestall 
the occurrence of an error by detecting hardware faults at an 
early stage. The programs can also be used for fault 
pinpointing once an error has occurred.
/  * Htr* w
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Both self testing and Mutual testing must be included because of 
the possibility that the software in a node is corrupted. This 
corruption, when affecting tho self-test software, may'cause the 
node to erroneously report itself fault-free. The testing of a 
node by another node will.detect this situation.
A7.3.1 Test Descriptions
All parts of the system should be exercised by the test programs, 
including the
- memory components
- processor subsystem
- I/O equipment
- inter-node communication equipment 
and any other special equipment.
Fixed dhta, designed to detect stuck-at faults, and random 
data, . to give as high a pattern-dependent fault coverage as pos­
sible, must be used.
Programs should be provided to activate remote tests, and 
others should be designed to respond to these activations by per­
forming the required teat(s) and reporting back via the com­
munications bus.
All routines must, on detection of an error, report this fact 
to the operating system.
A7.3.2 Test Scheduling
Equipment testing may be scheduled to take place in three cir­
cumstances.
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When the cpu has no tasks to run, equipment testing must be un­
dertaken to detect hardware faults as early as possible.
If the voting mechanism (or any other mechanism) indicates that 
a node has erred too often, then the node must remove itself 
from the operational system and perform self-tests until it has 
either failed to isolate a fault, or has pinpointed the 
fault as tightly as the teats allow.
Finally, when the voting mechanism is incapable of
Identifying the erring nodes after errors have been detected 
(i.e. when two or three nodes err simultaneously), then all 
three nodes must cease application execution, 6|nd perform 
self- and mutual-tests. 1
A7.3.3 Test Records - . |
As before, error and fault records must be updated according to 
the results of the tests.
Also, records must be kept on the condition of devices, 
especially whether or not they may be used.
A7.4 Time-staggered Operation
This aspect of the system is key to the effectiveness of. the 
voting mechanism. By ensuring that the nodes do not execute the 
same instruction at the same time, the probability of .two nodes 
producing the same error due to a transient fault is made insig­
nificant. Hence the voting mechanism can detect the errors.-
A7.4.1 Setting up of Stagger
Procedures must be provided by which the relative clock times of 
the nodes can be set to different values. Also, it must be pos­
sible to check the stagger periodically so that clock drift does 
not move the clock positions too far from or close to one
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another. Errors must be brought to the attention of the operating, 
system.
Any errors uncovered by the time staggering set-up or check pro­
cedures should be noted in the error record structure.
A 7 .6 Watchdog Timing
This part of the system provides extra error and fault detection 
capability to the system.-
A7.5.1 Task Completion Checks
After each task,■ the node must make available to other nodes the 
task number (Identification) and completion time of the last 
task. This data will form the task-complete record for the task.
Thereafter, the node must check the. total task-complete 
record set (from all nodes) to see if there are any dis­
crepancies. Both task numbers and task complete-times must be 
checked.
Any discrepancies must be reported to the operating system •for 
appropriate action.
A7.5.2 Timing Records
Again, errors must be noted in the error record structure.
A7.6 Error Handling
The system must provide the facility to preserve system 
operation when an error has occurred. There should be the 
means to restore the system to its fault-free state wherever 
possible.
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A7.6.1 Rode Errors
The first sign of a fault is the detection of a node error, by 
any of the means , included in the system. When this occurs, 
the operating system must take appropriate action. This action 
is to be provided by the error handling routines.
If a node has erred only once (or an acceptable number of 
times), then a number of actions must be taken.
Firs.t» the error muit be recorded in the error record data 
base. Secondly, the correct data must be provided to the err­
ing node. Thirdly, nodes must begin voting on which task to ex­
ecute. i
If an .unacceptable number of errors has occurred in one 
node, then more severb action must taken. Firstly, the error 
record base must be updated , and then examined to see if any 
conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the fault.
Then the node must be instructed to cease application program ex­
ecution and to perform extensive self-testing. Once the self 
testing procedure is complete, the node may then begin execution 
of application programs if it has sufficient capability. 
The current schedule list must be provided to the node at this 
time, by the other nodes. The node .may then provide data for 
voting, as before, but must be ignored until it has produced 
correct data for an adequate number of successive votes.
A7.6.2 Fault Diagnosis
In order to facilitate fault isolation and to provide data for 
system repairs and improvement, it is necessary that the system 
perform fault diagnosis whenever it is suspected that a fault ex­
ists (namely when a node is isolated for beating).
This process should be the systematic application of test proce­
dures to isolate faults as much as possible. Once the fault is
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pinpointed, an alternative resource may be used in place of the
faulty resource if one is available.
A7.6.3 Error and Fault Records
Error handling routines must provide the bulk of the error and 
fault record roa'Mpulation. When an error report is made, the 
routines must update the relevant records, such as node­
error counts, error-type counts etc.
A7.7 Task Control
A most important part of the operating- system, task control 
routines, must be provided to take care of the scheduling and 
dcscheduling of tasks, both application tasks and operating
system tasks. :
A7.7.1 Maintenance of Scheduling Lists
Routines must be provided by which application tasks must be able 
to schedule and deschedule other application tasks, Routines must
also maintain Order in the lists for ease of task execution in­
itiation.‘
Normal execution lists will include both operating , - system 
routines and application routines, while an exception list must 
be available when the node is instructed by the system to un­
dergo testing.
A7.7.2 Performance of Scheduling
When no exceptions have been discovered, the normal list is fol­
lowed, while in exceptional circumstances, the exception list 
becomes active.
If a node is identified as having erred, then, as a 
precaution, the nodes will confer on each task before it is ex­
ecuted, This will identify a fault if errors arc then
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detected. Also, this will prevent the execution of an in­
correct task. If the cpu is too busy to handle the extra load, 
then the precaution itust be forfeited, and the voting and 
watchdog mechanisms • must be relied on to detect the execution 
of an incorrect task.
Abnormal conditions detected by any of these routines must be 
reported. 1
A7.7.3 Task Records !■
A record must be madii on the execution of each 'task. This will 
aid system testing, maintenance, repair and improvement.
Errors,must be recorded.■
A7 .8 Inter-node Communication
Although the communication is to be imitated using common 
memory, the correct format is to be retained so that in the in­
tended application, little modification is necessary.
A7 .8 ,1 Communication!: Handling
Routines must be provided by which modules may transmit and 
receive messages via the communications bus system. These 
routines must control all communication board-dependent 
functions, thus simplifying the communication procedure and 
providing an error Interception method.
All errors and faults signalled by the communication board must 
be reported to the operating system.
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This appendix gives: the complete software functional specifica­
tion, which was derived from the software requirement specifica­
tion.. 1 Each section of the appendix starts with a diagram that 
shows jjjow the described software fits into the system.
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1/1
I
I/O
Device
feedback reasonableness error
& feedback & consistency signallin
checking checking
READBACX AND FEEDBACK CHECKING:
Retidback - If the output bhannel has a readback input 
channel, then this is noted in the I/O device record 
structure. The readback checking facility is called when an 
" output is performed, and the application wishes to check that 
the Output channel is operational. The readback facility 
examines the I/O device records to see if there is a readback 
input channel, and tp get the tolerances associated with the 
output channel. It then compares the output value requested 
b.T". the readback value read. If the values are sufficiently 
.close, then the module returns a status of OK. If the vfiluea 
'are too far apart, then the module creates an error and a 
fault record, and returns a st.atuo of NOT OK,
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Feedback - The routine simply compares the actual feedback 
values with those that the application telle it to expect. 
The facility is used as an extra device check when required. 
The application program must supply the expected value. The 
feedback routine then obtains a feedback value and compares 
the two. If the difference is more than a tolerable value, 
then the feedback check routine returns a status of NOT OK 
and ..creates an error and a fault record. If the difference is 
acceptable, then the routine returns a status of OK.
REASONABLENESS AND CONSISTENCY CHECKING
Reasonableness - Upper and lower bounds exist for input 
device readings. These values are stored in the 1/0 device 
records. When an input is measured, the returned value is 
compared with these values to see if the input is reasonable. 
If the value is out of bounds, the routine creates error and 
fault records, and returns a status of NOT ok. Otherwise a 
status of OK is returned.
Consistency - There is a maximum rate of change possible for 
each input channel. The value is held in the I/O device data 
base. A new input value is compared with the previous input 
value from that device. If the difference is too large, then 
the routine creates an error and a fault record,and returns ,a 
status value of NOT OK. Otherwise, the status value is OK.
ERROR SIGNALLING
Error signalling is accomplished in two parts. First, an. 
error record is generated. This brings the error to the 
attention of the operating system via the record creation 
subroutines. Secondly, the application program is alerted
APPENDIXSOFTWARE FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION ’
I/O
I/O
consistent all types
signallingroting input
When on application program wishes to obtain an important 
piece of information, it must use an input routine provided 
by the system. The application provides an identification of 
the required information. The system call returns the value
records to get the form of the input required. Each node that
.t over the bus network in a sequence that 
tagger is maintained. If an acceptable numbi
of OK so that the application may continue. Ai 
is generated if there arc errors. If a double ( 
error is detected, then the module returns a
generated. The application must decide
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When an application program wishes to perform output in a 
fault^tolerant manner, it must use an output routine provided 
by the system. The application provides the data, and the 
identification of the output path. The system returns a 
•status value. The routine determines the characteristics of 
j^he data to be output, from the I/O records. The routine then 
obtains the other versions of the data from the other nodes, 
vdtes, and performs the necessary output action.
CONSISTENT INPUT D A T A -
' Consistency of input data is ensured, since-the nodes vote on 
the same data.
ALL TYPES OF, I/O
ROM and RAM Each node has local ROM and RAM, which hold a 
version of the data. When an input from ROM or RAM is needed, 
the. routine obtains all versions Of the data via .the 
’ communications bus. The voted version is returned to the 
application. If the routine finds that the result of the vote 
. is different to the value held in its local RAM, then the 
d’oiSrect value is written into the RAM, and an appropriate 
error record is generated.
When an output to RAM is needed, the routine obtains all 
versions of the data via the data bus, votes, and writes the 
•result into memory.
) Node sensor inputs - Most sensors are not replicated at each 
node. The I/O device records hold the configuration details. 
When sensor input is required, the routine checks the I/O 
device records to find out which nodes can provide input 
data. If the local node has the required inputs, then the 
routine reads the data and transmit the value to the other 
nodes. It also receives the data from the other nodes.
SOFTWARE FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION . APPENDIX 8
Averaging takes place where necessary, applying a tolerance 
appropriate to the '"device (also held in the I/O device 
records) to decide whether or not the input is valid. When 
there is only one sensor, it is the responsibility of the 
local node to pass the data to the other nodes.
Node servo outputs - Most servos are the single-input type, 
and . are associated with a particular node. When output to 
such a servo is to be gade, ..%ach node submits a value for the 
output, the local nodt v-qn the submissions, and performs
the actual output. . ^-input servos are present, the
' inputs are attached to-.-. jrent nodes. Again., each node 
submits a value, and ' each node with a physical output 
performs the actual operat|i"0u.
Discrete sensor inputs - When the sensors are remote from the 
computing nodes, they are controlled^ via the communication 
b u s . " In this- case, any of the computing nodes has the 
‘.capability to transmit the control instruction. The current 
'-ems master issues the actual command.
Discrete servo outputs-r Similarly,•servo control instructions 
are. issued by the current bus master. - .
MULTI-INPUT SERVOS " . . .
Multi-input servos are catered for ih the I/O request 
servicing routines,
ERROR SIGNALLING
Errors are reported to the application by means of status 
values, and to the operating system via the creation of error 
and fault records.
•n - /•'
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TASK
. I/O 
oRECORDS
I/O Error Fault'
Channel Records Records
Statue
I/O CHANNEL STATUS
I/O channel records provide t h e .information necessary for the 
operating system • to perform I/O operations. Most of the 
information is invariant, end,is-: programmed into permanent 
storage. The remainder of the data is established at 
run-time. . ■ .c ■
The records consist of an identifier, followed by 
type-dependent permanent parameters.
Memory - A memory record consists of an identifier marking 
the memory as ROM or RAM, followed by the node address(es).
'Input - An input device (sensor) record consists of an 
identifier marking the device as a sensor, followed by the 
node address(es) of the device, and the local address of the 
device. (Note that more than one sensor may be available 
provide a particular piece of data). Also included are
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a maximum positive rate of change and a maximum negative rate 
of change for the variable, thus defining the consistency 
limits for the variable. An upper and a lower bound for 
reasonability are stored so that an error can be signalled 
should the variable attain a value outside these bounds. 
An input deviation tolerance is included, which sets down the 
maximum deviation that is tolerated between like sensors.
Output - An output device record consists of an identifier, 
marking the device as a servo, followed by the node 
addressCes) of the device, and its local address. The IDs of 
associated devices are stored next. If the output has a 
readback input associated with it, then the following infor­
mation is the input ID. Otherwise it is an invalid value. If 
the output has a feedback input associated with it, then 
the following information is the input ID. Otherwise it is 
an invalid value. If there is readback, a readback tolerance 
follows, and if there is feedback then there is a feedback 
tolerance next.
For each input, there is a temporary storage space (i.e. in 
RAM) where the last measured value is stored, as well as a 
time when the value was measured. These values are ut,ed to 
determine whether or not the input is consistent.
For every device, there is a status record, showing whether 
or not the device can be used. This is also in RAM.
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ID-> ROM/SAM
node addrs
INPUT
upper reafeon 
bound
lower reason 
bound 1
ID-> servo
node addrs
readback
tolerance
ID-> OK/NOT OK
max deviatioi
feedback
tolerance
last reading
time of last 
reading-'
ERROR RECORDS
All error records conform to a standard format, so that 
manipulation of this data is simplified.
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The error record must contain the ID of the data which was 
found to be erroneous, and its node’s bus address, the method 
of detection which exposed the error (error type), and the 
bus address of the node which found the error.
error type
The node address is necessary because,data will have the same
memory addresses in the final system..
FAULT RECORDS
All fault records also conform to a standard format.
The fault record must contain the ID of the ddvice which is
faulty, the method of fault detection (fault type), the bus
address of the node which found the fault, and the node-time 
at which the fault was found.
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device lb
fault type
I.
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SELF AND 
MUTUAL 
TESTING
equipment
random
equipment
remote
t.qsfc
responsi
remote
signalli:
Memory : testing is a time " cdlrfeuming process. If there is 
adequate cpu time available, all memory is tested. Otherwise, 
only representative pieces of each IC are tested.- (Total IC
failure is. more common thah individual memory cell failu 
Complete memory tests are executed at power-up.
e).
The memory testing procedure is: ' .
1) A block of memory is transferred to a temporary memory 
location. The copy is checked against the original to see 
if any error has occurred" in the transfer. \
2) A sequence of "sliding ones" 
and read back. This shows 
cross-coupling faults of both 
system which provides access to
.s written into the block,; ' 
'stuck-at" faults, and 
the memory and the bus
\ 7
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3) Pseudo-random numbers are written into the block of 
memory being tested," and into another temporary storage 
area. These data are compared. This test is intended to 
reveal pattern-dependent faults.
4) The original data is copied back to the memory block, 
and this is again checked against the duplicate.
If an error is detected at any of the stages, an error and a 
fault record are produced. The routine is called by the 
operating system, and returns a status of OK or NOT OK, as 
necessary, allowing immediate fault handling if the operating 
system so wishes.
At the end of memory tests, the processor communicates' the 
results with the other nodes, so that they may update their 
records.
PROCESSOR
I't-'is essential that the processor is operational, or the 
node is incapable of . performing- any useful work. The 
processor is therefore extensively tested before the system 
is put into opet.. ■t\l and is periodically re-tested to . en­
sure that it remains operational.
Thd core instructions are tested first, because they are 
required to test the other instructions. The core 
instructions are
1) memory to register transfer
2) register to register comparison
3) conditional branch
If any of these instructions fail, then no further testing is 
possible, and the node is useless. Therefore the processor
SOFWABB FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION APPENDIX 8
sends an appropriate message to the operator, and operation 
terminates.
If the instructions are executed successfully, then testing 
of the processor continues. All possible processor commands 
are tested, using known data and precomputed results..
Power-up testing starts with processor checking;. when this is 
complete, other tests are undertaken. When periodic processor 
checking is done, a status value returned in .addition to 
the error - and fault records< which are produced whenever 
necessary.
At the end of the processor tests, the node communicates the 
results to the other nodes so that they may update their 
records. '
I/O EQUIPMENT
Since the system may be used in different environments, it is 
possible to add or remove I/O equipment test routines as 
necessary. Therefore, the core I/O equipment test routine 
consists of a set of calls to all the appropriate 
sub-routines, which test the different types of equipment.
The present system requires two. types of testing
1) analog input .
2) analog output >
Analog input - The first checks on the analog inputs are of 
the I/O board registers. All those registers which may be 
checked, by reading back, are loaded with appropriate values
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N ext, all input channels are read, and their values checked 
for reasonableness. The I/O. device records are consulted.
Analog output - All output channels with readback and/or 
feedback capabilities are set to a series of output values 
appropriate to the devices they control. Readback and 
feedback are performed, and the values checked against those 
" which are expected.
If the results of thg tests show errors, thenx-beyh the output 
and the readback/feedback devices are marked as faulty, 
because it is not possible to distinguish.between them with 
respect to the position of the fault.
Error and fault records are generated when an error j is 
detected. A status value of OK or NOT OK is returned. At the 
end of I/O testing, the node communicates the results to the 
other node»fso that they may update their records.
INTER-NODE COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT
The communication contr^llar board is intelligent, and 
performs many of its own checks. The result of these checks 
is returned via a status word in the communication system 
control block. t ' ^
On power-up, the board is given a software reset command, and
the status is read to see if any faults are present. .
When the system is operating, and the communication equipment 
is to be tested, a NOP command is issued, and the status is
Next, a communication link is established between two 
controllers. Known messages are passed between the nodes; any 
discrepancies or error reports are noted. Random data is used
for the testing. All action commands that can be tested ap-e
verified. ,
229
SOFTWARE FUNCTIONAL SPECIFICATION APPENDIX 8
Error and fault records are generated when an error-is 
detected.- A status value of OK or NOT OK is returned-.
At the end of the inter-node communication equipment testing, 
the node communicates the results to the other nodes so that 
they may update their records. ‘ '
RANDOM ..DATA GENERATION
Random data is used in many of the test procedures.
Psetido-random numbers with a flat distribution curve are 
generated, using a seed obtained from an uninitialized RAM
REMOTE TEST ACTIVATION
In order to provide mutual testing, a set of routines must 
provide the necessary actions.
Remote test activation takes place'1 according to a fixed 
sequence. This allows the establishment of a rendezvous 
between participating nodes.
The activating node sends a message to the activated node, 
instructing it to perform a sequence of tests. The activated 
node responds by performing the requested tests one by one, 
sending a report message back to the activating node after 
, each test.
The activating node monitors the test results and generates 
appropriate error and fault records which it also later sends 
to the activated node so that its records can be updated.
REMOTE TEST RESPONSES
The activated node produces a report message consisting of 
the results of each test and the node’s opinion of the
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results. This enables the activating node to decide whether 
or not the activated node is capable of meaningful decisions.
Thv activated node then accepts any error or fault records 
from the activating node, perforins self-tests if necessary, 
and creates its own error and. fault records.
ERROR SIGNALLING
Self and mutual testing routines are invoked by the operating 
system. Therefore the returned status messages provide the 
operating system with the ability to decide on the course of 
action, according to the results.
Error and fault records are also generated.
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SELF AND 
MUTUAL 
TESTING
Scheduling
cpu 1 ' erring unresolved
idle , node note
CPU IDLE '
All free cpu time is used for additional system confidence 
testing. This allows early detection of hardware” fdiluret. 
Tests are done in a cyclic manner, with as many ^tests 'qs ■ 
possible being fitted into the cpu-idle times. At the.next 
cpu-idle time, testing resumes with the ne'St test in the
°"i'- " " . It /.
For the purpose of fitting tests into free time," a table must 
hold the WITH-RRROR execution times for each test' fi'.e. 
including the time needed to create errdr arid fault records).
The operating system checks on the available time, checks l|he 
required time for the next test, and executes the next test 
if time permits. "
Appropriate error and fault records are generated.
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ERRING NODE
When the error handling section of the' system decides that a 
node has produced too many errors, it instructs the node to 
perform a sequence of self-tests. If the errors exhibited by 
the node are all of a particular type, then it is only 
necessary for the node to test the appropriate subsystem. If 
the Jesting reveals a fault, then “the „node reports the fault. 
If ho fault is revealed, then the node must remain configured 
out of the system. v -
' If the detected fault is not sufficiently serious to cause 
total node failure (e.g. duplicated sensor failure), then the 
node may be brought back into operation. Otherwise the node 
is no longer considered part of the system (e.g. in the., case 
of processor failure).
UNRESOLVED VOTE
It .would be wasteful to shut down J h e  system after only one 
U.,resolved vote. The chances are greet '-Svhai the mis-vo'teV was 
the result of a transient fault.Therefore?, system s-htit-down 
occurs only after an unacceptable Lumber of mis-,",otes have 
occurred.
In such a circumstance,it can be taken ty  imply that at least 
two nodes have a fault. Since the operational node.cannot be 
pinpointed by the voting m e c h a n i s ^  |ll nodes must perform 
self- and mutual-testa in an effort to_j$nd the faults. If no 
faults are found, then the system mr ... ^nue to operate.
After a further unacceptable numba if«s, the
considered inoperable, and is shut
stei
„vi i. _ .1 iSlf M t,A
- - /
r < ;  ,
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SELF AND 
MUTUAL , 
TESTING
Records
device error
availability records
fdult
.records
DEVICE-AVAILABILITY
Device status is held in RAM, ‘ W d  isCj,identified by the device 
ID. If any -of the self at tests determine that a
device is not serviceable, th^UAWils- device status 'is-''tipdated.
, w o . „  ..
Error records conform with the standdvd...format.
Fault records conform with the sLandard forme^f.
■ ; '  ■ ' ■■■ ■" - .
. r - -  - . - j - '
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OPERATION
J  up
Stagger
stagger clock
Initialization checks signalling
STAGGER INITIALIZATION li
After system initialization, jithe, o1»bok#,'' ere- .read by each 
node. The clock-time at whicfh each nad^-m^st reset its clock 
is determined by adding a setf-up time ’to the read value of 
■Oaoh clock. The set-up time! is pre-ttiteriiiined, apd consists 
of the time 'lecessary fob, the & *^h.lat^ons, the time 
differences between the reading of -‘.h^’W t o c k s , the time for 
communication of the time readings, shdrt safety time. 1
!
The procedure for each node is there
get all node calculate each | chock serer'tlines wait set zero
times zero-!-inte | with other ritides time
If the zero-time check reveals disagreement between the 
nodes, then an error record is generated, and the procedure 
is repeated. Multiple errors indicate a faulty node. The
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operator is alerted, and the node is instructed to perform 
self- and mutual-tests. If these teats reveal serious node , 
faults, then the node is left out of the system. Otherwise., 
corrective action is made, and the node is overruled in the 
saro-time vote.
CLOCK CHECKS
Immediately after stagger initialization, and also 
periodically, clock stagger checks are made.
" The clocks are read and compared. If the difference is 
acceptable, then no action is taken.
If there is too large a discrepancy in the relative clock 
positions, then resynchronization i.s done, using the same 
procedure as for stagger initialization, but setting the time 
to an appropriate value. An error record is': generated if the 
clock discrepancy reveals a serious clock error (i.e. greater 
than the expected drift rate would cause), and a status of 
NOT OK is returned.
ERROR SIGNALLING
Errors are detected in the clock-check stage,: and error 
records are generated in error conditions. The status value 
allows the operating system to take Appropriate action.
' "  Y . ' r ,
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OPEHATIO'
■A - ' 1
"li
Error records conform with the standard format.
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WATCHDOG
TIMING
Checks
production complete-
of task- time
complete checks checks
number signalling
records
PRODUCTION OF TASK-COMPLETE RECORDS
When each, task is completed, the operating system in each 
node provides the other nodes with the task identifier and 
its task-completion time. This is done in a pre.-determined 
sequence via the communication bus. A table is created, using 
the values obtained via the ..communication bus and the nodes 
own values. This table forms the task-complete records.
COMPLETE-TIME CHECKS
Each node, before executing the next task, reads each 
task-complete time from its task-complete records. The 
difference between the values is checked against a known 
maximum difference. If the times are sufficiently close, then 
no action is taken. If the times are too far apart, then an 
error record is generated;.
TASK-NUMBBR CHECKS
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a message to the node which has executed the incorrect 
informing it of the correct next-task to execute. If a 
task execution error occurs, then the node is instru 
perform self-validation. Otherwise no action" is taken.
EitROH SIGNALLING
Errors are signalled when tusk nyjibers<or task-complex 
are found to be incorrect.
second
i <1 iffallffiirrft
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consistency , 
restoration reconfiguration
CONSISTENCY RESTORATION
confidence
This is the most common form of error; handling.
Inconsistencies take the form of incorrect data, which is 
detected by . the voting mechanism. The voting mechanism 
overrules any single errors1) thereby restoring consistency 
to the erring node.
If a node has executed an incorrect task,.then 
section detects this, and the node is informed 
next task, thereby restoring task 'consistency.
watchdog
NODE RECONFIGURATION
Node reconfiguration is the proce 
instructed to cease application exe 
self-validation.
by which nodes a: 
ion, and to perfo
his instruction 
nacceptable number o 
s noticed in the
oin the detection wof an 
in a particular - node, which 
rd and fault record handling
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When a node receives such an instruction, it begins an 
analysis of bhe error records which led to the action. Using 
the data obtained from the error records, the node performs 
appropriate self-tests of the faulty section. This leads 
to any existing fault being detected. Then a fault record is 
created, and the task I/O table is modified to show the 
faulty device.
Next, the node notifies the system that it has completed its 
tests, and it informs the 'system of any faults discovered. 
The other nodes respond by updating their fault records, and 
supplying the erring node with the current execution list.
NODS RESETTING
The erring node has been reset tince it has performed all the 
necessary tests and received the current execution list.
The node then executes tasks as normal, submitting results in 
the usual way. If faults were pinpointed, then the faulty 
devices are not used. Otherwise, the node is used as normal.
In the voting procedure, healthy nodes ignore the 
contribution of the erring node as far as the vote is 
concerned, but count the number of correct submissions that 
the node makes. The count is reset to, zero every time the 
node makes an error. After a pro-determined number of correct 
submissions, the system again uses the erring node, resetting 
the count of errors_since_last_validated to zero.
NODE SELF-CONFIDENCE MESSAGES
Node self-confidence is indicated iTi two ways, Firstly, when 
the self-testing is complete, the ready message indicates the 
status of the node. Secondly, the submission of correct data 
for voting and task-complete checks indicates whether or not 
the node is ready for use.
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ERROR
HANDLING
Diagnosis
pinpointing '
FAULT PINPOINTING
Fault pinpointing is the process of localising faults by 
applying tests appropriate to the detect'ed errors.
The error records indicate the ID of the errors detected. The 
pinpointing process ascertains the type of the error which 
caused the node isolation (i.e. ROM, RAM, servo, sensor etc.). 
Then the self-tests applicable to that device type are used 
te confirm the existence of the fault. Otherwise general 
tests are made to find the root cause of the error.
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provide the means for theThe error handling1 routi; 
creation, and Maintenance of error record:
Whenever an error is detected, a call is made to 
record creation procedure. The procedure is passed
1) the ID of the data found to be ii
2) the type of
The routine pieces thi 
node's address into 
propriat< 
address
the detecting 
mror record. It then updates the ap-
ROM, RAM, sensor eri
particular node/type coinbinutioi
•xoeeds the acceptubli
'ide the means for the
\  ' ' - < /  .y . - ' . ' "
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■ ible,’ault has been pinpointed as far as is poes
testing procedures-, the following informatii.lag
-1) the ID of the device found- to be faulty
2) the type of fault
this information, plusThe routine plai 
node's address and the detection time into a fault record. It 
then modifies the status ,of the device to show that it is not
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CONTROL
Maintenance 
of Scheduling
scheduling & normal & • error
deacheduling ■ exception signalling
lists
SCHEDULING AND DESCHEDULING
Scheduling and deacheduling of tasks is done via operating 
system calls that keen track of time Usage.
The task schedule list is in the form of a linked list so 
that new entries can bo inserted in the correct time-defined 
position. Hence, no list sorting is necessary.
Scheduling - When the scheduling of a tusk is desired, the 
program calls a scheduling routine. This routine requires the 
ID of the task to be schedulod, and the time of its 
execution.
The routine then obtains the expected task execution time 
(including error handling) from the task descriptor list. It., 
then checks the tusk schedule list to see if the time between 
the start time and the end time of bhe task has already been 
allocated. If so, an error record is gonorutod and a status 
of NOT OK is returned, so that the program attempting to 
schedule can take appropriate action.
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If the time is vacant, then tb? task schedule list is updated 
to include the new task, A /<tatus of OK is returned.
Descheduling - When deschedul^ng is.required, the routine is 
called, and the task ID is passed, t % descheduling procedure 
searches the task schedule lisjfc and removes the appropriate 
ehcry, thus making that tin^h available for other tasks. If 
the .task is not found, then Ij an error record is created 
because this means that a : task which should have.been 
scheduled was not. A status of. NOT OK is returned.
NORMAL AND EXCEPTION LISTS ,
Separate physical lists are1 not present. In exception 
conditions, the task scheddjle list’ is cleared, and those 
tasks which are appropriate to the ; exception condition are 
scheduled instead. j
i!
ERROR SIGNALLING i i "  ,
ii - /  . .
Scheduling and descheduling^error' reports are provided when 
such errors occur. -
The status value returned to |the calling program enables it 
to take appropriate action. I1
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CONTROL
Performance
Scheduling
signalling
exception
NORMAL OR. EXCEPTION LISTS
Since only one list is to be supported, with its entries set 
appropriate to the conditions, there Is no need for the 
scheduling routines to make any distinction-
scheduling is accomplished after each task is completed, by 
examining' the task schedule list. If there is adequate time 
before the next task, self-tests are run. Otherwise a call is 
made to schedule the next. task.
In exception conditions, the Operating system modifies the 
task schedule list to include only those tasks which are 
necessary for the test procedures, and for other functions 
needed to handle the exception.
After every execution, the task schedule list is ) 
removing the task.
odified by
If the inter-task time chock ; 
then 11 scheduling error recor
tils a valiii 
generated.
less than 0,
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NEXT-TASK VOTING
When a node has made the error of executing an incorrect 
task {detected,by the watchdog mechanism), next-task voting 
is begun.
Before any task is executed, the task ID is communicated 
between the nodes, and a vote is taken to lessen the chances 
of another incorrect execution. Error records are produced 
when necessary.
If there is inadequate time before the next task, then the 
vote is omitted, and the other mechanisms are relied on for 
detection of errors.
ERROR SIGNALLING
Error records are generated when necessary.
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CONTtiOI
±  
Records■
task error
execution records
details
TASK EXECUTION DETAILS
To aid diagnostics etc., a list of tasks run, -with their 
initiation times and completion times, is kept, and updated 
after the execution of each task, .
ERROR RECORDS x-
Error records conform with the sttihdard format.
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COMMUNICATION
Handling
lignalling
receptii
TRANSMISSION AND RECEPTION
i - A pointer to the data to be transmitted, i 
:he number of bytes to be transmitted, and th< 
of the message (ALL for broadcast) is -passed t<
The routine writes the appropriate control inti 
■s up the command blocks and sets up the list o:
? it is the bus controller, .then it then activate:
the SCB, s.
transmit, fr<
Reception - 
be placed, maximum byte count are passed 
writes the appropriate control inti
ip the command block:
:eption. Othei
> i /  -S r i
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A multi-node co-operation routine allows the mutual exchange 
of data to be accomplished using only one call. This routine 
makes use of the transmission and reception routines to 
accomplish this effect.
The transmission and reception routines are provided for 
communication with non-fault-tolerant nodes, other
fault-tolerant 'groups on the b us, and for inter-node 
communication in exception conditions. The multi-node 
co-operation routine is used the most.
ERROR SIGNAttINO
Because the bus controller board is intelligent and provides 
status and error signals, these are examined to find 
communication errors. Then, normal error reports are 
generated, and, where a fault is identified, a fault record 
is also generated.
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Signalling
link creation is 
ssion and reception
facilitated by the use oi 
routines. When it is decided
the bus controlli 
This measagi 
nodes, which
testing
merely establishes the 
respond with an I'M
READY message. A status of 
testing can begin. If there is 
or negative resj 
returned. Error
received, then 
are generated.
isages are generated whenevei
, 1 
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INTER-NODE
COMMUNICATION
I
Modelling
Activity
characteristics
BUS CHARACTERISTICS
The modelling routine maintains buffers according to the 
commands, and produces, status and error messages in the 
format of the bus controller Card.
The routine reads the control commend in the system control 
block, and obtain the necessary data from it. It then 
accesses the command blocks and executes the appropriate 
actions according to the action commands, updating the 
necessary communication table entries, and transferring data 
between node buffers.
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records records
BUS ACTIVITY
To aid diagnostics etc., records of bus activity are 
produced. For each communication, the record holds source, 
destination and time of the communication.
ERROR RECORDS
Error records conform with the standard format.
FAULT RECORDS
Fault records conform with the standard format.
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SYSTEM
INITIALIZATION
I
Initialization 
Of Devices
device
initializatii
DEVICE INITIALIZATION
Device^ on th e .'186 board are initialized first, followed by 
initialization of all memory components, the analog I/O board 
and the inter-node bus controller,
After each initialization, a check back i"6 performed to 
ensure that the device is ready for use. If it is not, then 
the initialization is re-tried, and an error message is 
produced. If the second try fails, then a fault record is 
generated, and the device may not be used. If this fault 
means that none of the system may be used, then the■operator 
is alerted. 1
ERROR SIGNALLING
Failure to successfully initialize any device is reported 
first by an error record, then by a fault record.
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